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ABSTRACT
Data centers have been growing rapidly in recent years to meet the surging demand of
cloud services. However, the expanding scale of a data center also brings new security
threats. This dissertation studies emerging security issues in clouds and data centers
from different aspects, including low-level cooling infrastructures and different
virtualization techniques such as container and virtual machine (VM).
We first unveil a new vulnerability called reduced cooling redundancy that might be
exploited to launch thermal attacks, resulting in severely worsened thermal conditions in
a data center. Such a vulnerability is caused by the wide adoption of aggressive cooling
energy saving policies. We conduct thermal measurements and uncover effective
thermal attack vectors at the server, rack, and data center levels. We also present
damage assessments of thermal attacks. Our results demonstrate that thermal attacks
can negatively impact the thermal conditions and reliability of victim servers, significantly
raise the cooling cost, and even lead to cooling failures. Finally, we propose effective
defenses to mitigate thermal attacks.
We then perform a systematic study to understand the security implications of the
information leakage in multi-tenancy container cloud services. Due to the incomplete
implementation of system resource isolation mechanisms in the Linux kernel, a spectrum
of system-wide host information is exposed to the containers, including host-system
state information and individual process execution information. By exploiting such leaked
host information, malicious adversaries can easily launch advanced attacks that can
seriously affect the reliability of cloud services. Additionally, we discuss the root causes
of the containers’ information leakage and propose a two-stage defense approach. The
experimental results show that our defense is effective and incurs trivial performance
overhead.
Finally, we investigate security issues in the existing VM live migration approaches,
especially the post-copy approach. While the entire live migration process relies upon
reliable TCP connectivity for the transfer of the VM state, we demonstrate that the loss of
TCP reliability leads to VM live migration failure. By intentionally aborting the TCP
connection, attackers can cause unrecoverable memory inconsistency for post-copy,
significantly increase service downtime, and degrade the running VM’s performance.
From the offensive side, we present detailed techniques to reset the migration
connection under heavy networking traffic. From the defensive side, we also propose
effective protection to secure the live migration procedure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As cloud computing has become the mainstream of providing IT services, it is essential to achieve
high availability and reliability for computing services hosted inside a cloud. Unfortunately, system
failures and data center power outages are not rare. One reason is that data centers have to
massively expand their scales to meet the ever-increasing service demands. Over-subscription
is widely adopted to deploy more servers than the infrastructure can support. Such aggressive
policies, though saving costs of upgrading facilities, exhaust the redundancies and tolerances for
unexpected faults and abnormal conditions. Even worse, the existence of those issues opens the
door for attackers and makes data centers vulnerable to various Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
To avoid service interruptions, it is imperative to uncover the potential vulnerabilities and build more
robust defense mechanisms in advance.
This dissertation investigates three emerging security threats in public clouds and data centers.
First, we unveil a new vulnerability called reduced cooling redundancy that could be exploited by
adversaries to severely worsen the thermal conditions in a data center. We systematically study
the induced damage and propose a dynamic thermal-aware load balancing to mitigate the threat.
Then, we uncover the information leakage problem in multi-tenancy container cloud services. We
demonstrate that the consequence of such leakages could lead to privacy breaches or even ser-
vice outages, and implement a two-stage defense system to secure container clouds. Finally, we
expose a new but serious vulnerability that can cause unrecoverable memory inconsistency in
existing virtual machine live migration, and we also propose effective defenses.
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1.1 Reduced Cooling Redundancy: A New Security Vulnerability in
a Hot Data Center
With more powerful servers being deployed at data centers, the amount of heat emitted by those
servers is also surging, which requires the cooling system tomore efficiently dissipate the increased
heat. Otherwise, the overheating would potentially lead to serious hardware failures and even
server shutdown for self-protection. Unfortunately, in recent years, the online service interruptions
due to cooling failures have not been rare in cloud vendors and enterprises, includingMicrosoft [15],
Rackspace [19], Wikipedia [21], iiNet [12], and University of Pennsylvania [20].
To regulate the temperature in computer rooms, a significant portion of the power consumption
of data centers is used for cooling. The cooling cost has reached 24%of a data center’s budget [10].
The key factor affecting the cooling cost of CRAC (Computer Room Air Conditioning) systems
is the supply air temperature. Data centers have deployed a variety of methods to control the
CRAC supply air temperature. For example, some data centers set the supply air temperature
automatically based on the workload. More importantly, a recent study shows that increasing the
supply air temperature bymerely 1◦C can save approximately 2-5 percent of the cooling power [38].
Thus, there is a trend in data centers to raise the highest set temperature from 75◦F to 85◦F or even
higher. It is reported that Google has raised the temperature of the cold aisle to 80◦F [7]. Those
aggressive cooling energy saving policies achieve a low PUE (Power Usage Effectiveness)1 in
a data center. However, the temperature increment also forces the servers running in a hotter
environment than before.
Furthermore, advanced techniques like power oversubscripion [42,96] have beenwidely adopted
to accommodate more servers in data centers without upgrading existing power and cooling infras-
tructures. While the infrastructures were initially well designed with sufficient cooling redundancies,
those redundancies have been excessively consumed by power oversubscription. Under the re-
duced cooling redundancies, an accidental synchronization of running intensive workloads in a set
of adjacent servers could result in a local hotspot and even a cascade effect further deteriorating
1PUE is the ratio of the total energy consumption of a data center to the energy consumed by computing equipments
in the data center.
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the thermal conditions.
In this dissertation, we unveil a new vulnerability of existing data centers with aggressive cool-
ing energy saving policies. Such a vulnerability might be exploited to launch thermal attacks that
could severely worsen the thermal conditions in a data center. Specifically, we conduct thermal
measurements and uncover effective thermal attack vectors at the server, rack, and data center
levels. We also present damage assessments of thermal attacks. Our results demonstrate that
thermal attacks can (1) largely increase the temperature of victim servers degrading their perfor-
mance and reliability, (2) negatively impact on thermal conditions of neighboring servers causing
local hotspots, (3) raise the cooling cost, and (4) even lead to cooling failures that force some
servers to shut down. Finally, we propose effective defenses to prevent thermal attacks from be-
coming a serious security threat to data centers.
1.2 ContainerLeaks: Emerging Security Threats of Information Leak-
ages in Container Clouds
Cloud computing has been widely adopted to consolidate computing resources. Multi-tenancy is
the enabling feature of cloud computing that allows computation instances from different tenants
running on a same physical server. Among different types of cloud services, the multi-tenancy
container cloud has recently emerged as a lightweight alternative to conventional virtual machine
(VM) based cloud infrastructures. Container is an operating system (OS) level virtualization tech-
nology with multiple building blocks in the Linux kernel, including resource isolation/control tech-
niques (e.g., namespace and cgroup) and security mechanisms (e.g., Capabilities, SELinux, Ap-
pArmor, and seccomp). By avoiding the overhead of additional abstraction layers, containers
are able to achieve near-native performance and outperform VM-based systems in almost all as-
pects [5, 43, 85]. In addition, the advent of container management and orchestration systems,
such as Docker and Kubernetes, have profoundly changed the ecosystem of building, shipping,
and deploying multi-tier distributed applications in the cloud.
Despite the success of container services, there always exist security and privacy concerns for
running multiple containers, presumably belonging to different tenants, on the same OS kernel.
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To support multi-tenancy on container clouds, we have observed on-going efforts in the Linux ker-
nel to enforce cross-container isolation and de-privilege user-level containers. Existing container-
enabling kernel features have greatly shrunk the attack surface exposed to container tenants and
could restrain most existing malicious attacks. However, not all subsystems of the Linux kernel
can distinguish execution contexts between a container and a host, and thus they might expose
system-wide information to containerized applications. Some subsystems are considered to be
of low priority for container adaptations. The rest are facing implementation difficulties for trans-
forming their code base, and their maintainers are reluctant to accept drastic changes. In order to
close these loopholes, current container runtime software and container cloud providers typically
leverage access control policies to mask the user-kernel interfaces of these container-oblivious
subsystems. However, such manual and temporary fixes could only cover a small fraction of the
exposed attack surfaces.
In this dissertation, we present the information leakage channels we discovered that are ac-
cessible within the containers. Such channels expose a spectrum of system-wide host information
to the containers without proper resource partitioning. By exploiting such leaked host information,
it becomes much easier for malicious adversaries (acting as tenants in the container clouds) to
launch advanced attacks that might impact the reliability of cloud services. Additionally, we dis-
cuss the root causes of the containers’ information leakages and propose a two-stage defense
approach. As demonstrated in the evaluation, our solution is effective and incurs trivial perfor-
mance overhead.
1.3 Sudden Death of Live Migration and Its Security Implications
Virtual machine live migration is the process of moving a running VM between two different phys-
ical machines with minimal disruption to the VM’s normal operations. As a powerful tool for sys-
tem maintenance [28], load balancing [103], fault tolerance [86], energy saving [37, 87], and per-
formance enhancement [27], VM live migration has been widely used in mainstream cloud ser-
vices [68]. The procedure of live migration includes the transfer of all memory pages and hardware
state over a pre-established TCP connection. One primary method used by the existing tools is
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the pre-copy approach [34], which first iteratively copies all memory pages as well as those pages
dirtied in the previous iteration. The VM is kept running until the last iteration, when pre-copy
pauses the VM and then finishes copying the rest of the memory pages. The total length of time
for the last procedure in pre-copy, known as service downtime, reaches up to many seconds [113]
depending on the copying rate and intensity of memory activities. To reduce service downtime, the
post-copy approach [58] was recently proposed. The post-copy approach immediately suspends
the source VM and copies the minimum execution states. The VM is quickly resumed at the desti-
nation side, and memory pages are then transferred. Using the post-copy approach, a significant
amount of service downtime could be saved, and various hypervisors have already integrated this
mechanism.
While researchers have made numerous efforts to improve the performance of VM live mi-
gration, little attention has been paid to the security implications of live migration. One potential
reason is that, currently, live migration is not made available to non-admin users in the cloud en-
vironment. Moreover, the confidentiality of the process can be safeguarded using encrypted live
migration [90,108,128]. This can further secure the migration process, preventing adversaries in
the middle of a network to hijack or falsify memory pages.
In this dissertation, we expose a new vulnerability in the existing VM live migration approaches,
especially the post-copy approach. The entire live migration mechanism relies upon reliable TCP
connectivity for the transfer of the VM state. We demonstrate that, if the host server is vulnerable
to off-path TCP attacks, the loss of TCP reliability leads to VM live migration failure. By inten-
tionally aborting the TCP connection, attackers can cause unrecoverable memory inconsistency
for post-copy, leading to a significant increase in downtime and performance degradation of the
running VM. Additionally, we present detailed techniques to reset the migration connection under
heavy networking traffic. We also propose effective defenses to secure the VM live migration.
Our experimental results demonstrate that memory inconsistencies could be devastating to some
applications, and it only takes a few minutes to reset a heavy migration connection.
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1.4 Overview
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents our research efforts
on launching and defending thermal attacks on data centers. Chapter 3 presents our investigation
of the information leakage problem on multi-tenancy container cloud services. Chapter 4 presents
our study on attacking and securing the live migration of virtual machines. Finally, Chapter 5
concludes this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Thermal Attack on Data Centers
In this chapter, we systematically investigate the security risk posed by those aggressive policies
applied on data centers. We introduce the concept of thermal attack, which can be easily and
remotely launched to seriously worsen the thermal conditions at a server level, a rack level, or even
a data center level, without requiring any privileges of a hypervisor. Thermal attacks simply run
thermal-intensive workloads in victim servers or VMs (Virtual Machines) to rapidly generate a large
amount of heat, forcing the victim servers into a high temperature. The overheated servers suffer
performance and reliability degradation. Even worse, the accumulated heat can further exacerbate
the thermal condition of the peripheral atmosphere, raising the inlet temperature of other servers.
The increase of the inlet temperature then increases other servers’ outlet temperatures, leading
to a vicious cycle. The consequence could be the great increase of hardware failures of many
servers in a data center, the significant waste of the cooling costs, and even thermal accidents that
force some servers to shut down.
To form the basis for mounting a thermal attack, we measure how thermal-related factors are
exhibited in a real server using different HPC (High Performance Computing) benchmarks. We
observe that CPU-intensive workloads can generate more heat and cause a higher temperature
than other types of workloads, even if the system utilization is at the same level; thus it can be
used as thermal-intensive workload to rapidly raise the temperature of a server (i.e., within a few
minutes), despite the fact that the temperature increase requires the accumulation of heat. Then,
based on our thermal measurements on the real server, we propose to mount thermal attacks
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in both non-virtualized and virtualized environments, as well as a pulsation thermal attack. As
expected, those attacks can largely raise the temperature of the hosting server within a short period
time. We further conduct a damage analysis in terms of electromigration, time dependent dielectric
breakdown, thermal cycling intrinsic hard failure mechanisms, and disk failure.
To evaluate the impact of thermal attacks on the entire data center, we conduct thermal attacks
at the data center level using a computational fluid dynamics based, trace-driven simulation, with a
special consideration of the air recirculation condition in the data center. We observe that launching
thermal attacks on less than 2 percent of servers in a data center can seriously affect the thermal
conditions of the whole data center and raise the cooling costs significantly. Even worse, in some
severe attack scenarios, thermal attacks can lead to cooling failures.
Finally, we discuss the attack costs and propose effective defenses against thermal attacks.
Although some prior studies have proposed temperature-aware load balancing (e.g., [84]), their ap-
proaches are mainly designed based on a static profile of the data center thermodynamics, which
is profiled using normal server workloads. As a result, such solutions cannot effectively handle
hotspots that are generated rapidly by malicious workloads at runtime, because the thermal condi-
tions can become significantly different and even completely opposite to the static pre-calculated
profile.
The chapter is organized as follows. We provide the background information on system cooling
and its inherent vulnerability to a thermal attack in data centers in Section 2.1. We present our
thermal measurement study on a real server in Section 2.2. We detail the thermal attacks in
non-virtualized/virtualized environments and the damage analysis in Section 2.3. We present the
thermal attacks and their impacts at the rack and data center levels in Section 2.4. We describe an
effective defense in Section 2.5. We survey the related work in Section 2.6, and finally we conclude
the chapter in Section 2.7.
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2.1 Background
2.1.1 Server Cooling
Computers have to be operated within a specific range of environmental temperatures. Otherwise,
electronic devices may fail to have their normal characteristics and may even malfunction. Most
hardware failures cause permanent damage and cannot be recovered. For a server, all its compo-
nents, like CPU, memory, cache, and bus, produce heat. The mega-scale and complicated design
of integrated circuits and chips in modern computer systems further exacerbates the heat genera-
tion problem. As a result, cooling techniques or thermal management methods are critical for both
hardware and software design. For instance, the chip design must consider heat generation and
emission. The positions of different chip components must be carefully chosen to avoid hotspots.
A fan is also often used to accelerate the heat emission. In software, various dynamic thermal
management mechanisms are proposed: If the temperature violates a carefully selected thresh-
old, the component would have to degrade its performance by reducing the operating frequency, or
it may even be forced to shut down for protection from physical damages [91]. Therefore, a redline
temperature is often set for a server. If the inlet temperature exceeds the redline temperature, the
server would be shut down because the fan itself is not sufficient to cool down the server.
2.1.2 Data Center Cooling
In a data center, tens to hundreds of thousands of high-density (e.g., blade) servers are placed in
one closed space, running simultaneously with a high workload utilization. A large amount of heat
is generated every second by those servers. Moreover, the fans push the generated heat into the
room. Due to possible air recirculation, the hot air may influence the environmental temperature
and further impact other servers. Therefore, data center cooling is even more critical due to the
high server density.
To cool down servers, existing data centers are equipped with various cooling technologies,
including the traditional CRAC air cooling, free air cooling, and liquid cooling. Restrained by geo-
graphic limitations and facility costs, CRAC-based air cooling remains the most widely used cooling
9
 Figure 2.1: Layout of a Typical Data Center.
solution. To enhance cooling efficiency, computer rooms are divided into hot aisles and cold aisles,
as shown in Figure 2.1. In a cold aisle, cold air is supplied from the raised floor and flows through
the back side of the server racks to absorb the heat generated by the servers. The resulting hot
air, with the help of server fans, then enters the hot aisle from the front side of the server racks,
and is returned (through the ceiling vents) to the CRAC system and cooled down by the chillers
again.
The inlet temperatures of servers must be strictly controlled in a data center in order to avoid
overheating, which increases the possibility of causing permanent hardware damage. If the inlet
temperature exceeds a threshold, parts of servers or even racks would be forced to shut down.
Ideally, the data center should have the cold air and hot air perfectly isolated for high cooling
efficiency. However, air recirculation can be common in a data center, in which hot air enters the
cold aisles through small gaps between insulation material and the server racks. Thus, cold and
hot air can get mixed to some extent as a result. The air density, air flow between servers, supply
air temperature of the cooling facilities, power consumption, and outlet temperature of each server
can get intertwined in a complicated way to impact the temperature of the whole server room.
Therefore, the hot air generated by the servers could potentially cause the inlet temperature to
violate the threshold.
To keep the inlet temperature below the safe threshold, the cooling facility’s supply air tempera-
ture selection is critical. For safety, a low supply air temperature is desired to reduce the possibility
of any thermal emergencies. However, a lower supply air temperature can result in a higher cooling
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cost. As a result, many data centers (e.g., Google) are trying to raise the supply air temperature
for a lower cooling cost. Currently, data centers can remain safe even with a higher supply air tem-
perature due to the existence of the cooling redundancies. However, with the deployment of more
powerful servers and the current trend of power oversubscription [45,133], which allows managers
to deploy more servers in a room, data centers will soon have almost no redundancies in the near
future. As a result, the possibilities of thermal emergencies can significantly increase with a higher
supply air temperature, making data centers vulnerable to thermal-related attacks.
Currently in data centers, the common cause of a cooling failure is the breakdown of cooling
facilities [12,19,21], which significantly reduces cooling capacity and slow down heat dissipation.
Conversely, by intentionally running thermal-intensive workloads, the vast heat generation can also
exceed the cooling capacity, resulting in a cooling failure in a data center.
2.1.3 Threat of Thermal Attacks
The security threat posed by thermal attacks to a data center is real and difficult to address, mainly
due to the following five reasons.
I. The root cause of the threat lies in the wide adoption of aggressive cooling and power man-
agement policies, such as raising the supply air temperature and power oversubscription, which
allow more servers being deployed in a data center with less cooling cost. Although data centers
were initially designed with sufficient cooling redundancies, those aggressive policies significantly
reduce the cooling redundancies, making data centers themselves vulnerable to abnormal thermal
conditions.
II. Although modern servers are equipped with various chip-level sensors, such as temperature
sensor for each core, those chip-level sensors cannot provide server-level information (e.g., server
inlet and outlet temperature). Core temperature does not equal to inlet temperature and outlet
temperature. A core’s temperature varies much faster. An effective thermal attack does not need
to stress the CPU all the times but just keep the outlet temperature at a high level. As a result,
Core sensors cannot provide server-level or DC-level thermal monitoring.
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III.While thermal sensors definitely help to monitor the thermal conditions in a computer room,
most of today’s production data centers have just a few thermal sensors or probes for the entire
data center. Deploying sensors on the server- or rack-level would be very costly. Even with rack-
level sensors (only 2-4 sensors per rack), it is impossible for them to cover hundreds of servers
in a rack. Thus, the occurrence of a local hotspot is inevitable. Without the global knowledge of
overall thermal conditions in a computer room, chip-level protections, like the Intel RAPL (Running
Average Power Limit) providing and limiting the power consumption for each CPU package, cannot
prevent the occurrence of local hotspots.
IV. To defend against thermal attacks on a data center, the thermodynamics of a data cen-
ter is important to consider. The temperature-based feedback control mechanism would help to
limit the temperature for local hotspots. However, such a feedback control mechanism does not
exist in the current data centers. At the chip-level, there are some feedback control mechanisms
used for overheating protection; however, at the data-center-level, without the global knowledge on
thermal conditions, it is very challenging to deploy feedback control mechanisms for temperature
management of the whole data center.
V. Since thermal-intensive workloads themselves are benign and do not exploit any system
vulnerabilities, it is difficult to distinguish attackers from normal users. Moreover, process-level
power/thermal profiling also cannot defend against data center level thermal attacks. Attackers
are not limited to use just one process to generate much more heat. They can use many accounts
to run different workloads simultaneously to generate a significant amount of heats.
2.2 Real Server Measurement
The thermal conditions of a server are affected by various factors. Unlike power that can be gener-
ated and terminated instantaneously, the change of temperature is a process of heat accumulation
and dissipation. Different components of a server run simultaneously and generate heat. The ac-
cumulated heat then causes the temperature to raise. To understand the thermal characteristics of
a physical server, we first perform a measurement study running in our small testbed. We carefully
design a set of experiments to explore the thermal characteristics of a server in the following four
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Figure 2.2: Inlet and Outlet Temperature of Servers.
aspects: (1) the impact of different workloads, (2) the thermal condition variations under the same
system utilizations, (3) the relationship between the thermal condition and power consumption, and
(4) the speed of heat accumulation and dissipation.
Our testbed is a mainstream Supermicro server, equipped with Intel Xeon 2.27GHz CPU with
16 cores, 32 GB of RAM and running Ubuntu Linux 12.04 with kernel version 3.13.0. The testbed is
placed in a sealed environment without any window to the outside world. The ambient temperature
is about 21◦C cooled by the central air conditioner in our building. We measure the inlet and
outlet temperature of the server using “Go!Temp” temperature probe, which has a resolution of
0.07◦C [11], and monitor the power consumption using “Watts up? .Net” digital power meter. The
inlet and outlet temperature of our server is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
2.2.1 Workload Impacts
We first explore how different workloads affect the thermal conditions of a server. The attack
workload should be designed to fully utilize all components, generate a large amount of heat and
raise the temperature in a fast and significant manner. The “man-made” hot status would reduce
the reliability of a server. To evaluate the impact, we pay special attention to the outlet temperature
of the server for the following two reasons. First, the output air is a direct sign of the temperature
of the server. The inner temperature can only be hotter than the outlet temperature. Second,
the output air is exported to the hot aisle of the computer room and further impacts the whole
atmosphere due to air recirculation. Thus, a high outlet temperature can negatively affect adjacent
servers in a computer room.
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Figure 2.3: Temperature with HPL, SPECCPU and TPCC-UVa.
We measure the outlet temperature of our server under three different scenarios. First, we use
TPCC-UVa database benchmark [78] as the workload to generate a large amount of I/O opera-
tions. TPCC-UVa benchmark is an open source TPC-C benchmark, which is an online transaction
processing benchmark, written in C language and using the PostgreSQL database engine. We set
the warehouse number 50 to ensure a sufficiently large workload, but keep the CPU utilization less
than 10% to limit the intensity of CPU activities. In the second scenario, we simultaneously run
the TPCC-UVa and the 456.hmmer benchmark from SPECCPU2006, which is a widely used HPC
benchmark. We run the 456.hmmer with 16 copies to fully utilize the CPU resources in our server.
In the third scenario, we add another HPC benchmark, the High Performance Linpack (HPL). The
Linpack benchmarks measure the capability of solving random matrix productions. There are mul-
tiple configurable parameters that could affect the workload of the benchmark. We set the number
of processors to 16 since our server is a 16-core machine. We set the problem size N, which is
the size of the input matrix, to 40,000. For the block size, we choose 100 in this experiment. This
configuration promises a heavy computing workload on our server. Since temperature increase is
a relatively long process of heat generation, we run the experiment for 100 minutes.
The experimental results are illustrated in Figure 2.3. Figure 2.3(a) shows the outlet temper-
ature under the three different scenarios. Although the air conditioning is set with a fixed supply
air temperature, the inlet temperature still varies in a range of 1◦C due to various surrounding
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Figure 2.4: Outlet Temperature with Different SPECCPU Benchmarks.
factors. We define the margin temperature as the difference between the outlet and inlet temper-
ature, which is shown in Figure 2.3(b). The margin temperature clearly indicates the temperature
increase because of running specific workloads on our server.
While the outlet temperature of the server at idle is about 30◦C, after heating by intensive
workloads on CPU, memory, and disk, the outlet temperature can reach up to 39◦C, as shown in
Figure 2.3(a). Specifically, I/O intensive workloads create heat and raise the outlet temperature
to some extent; more obviously, after running with CPU-intensive workloads like 456.hmmer, the
outlet temperature increases significantly. Then, additional workloads like HPL can further gen-
erate more heat on this basis. Given that the inlet temperature is about 21◦C set by the cold air,
the thermal-intensive workloads achieve a more than 18-degree temperature difference. Also, a
nearly 40◦C outlet temperature indicates an even hotter temperature inside the server. Thus, our
experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of mounting a thermal attack against a server using
thermal-intensive workloads, especially CPU-intensive workloads.
2.2.2 System Utilization
To explore the outlet temperature variation under the same system utilization, we use a set of
SPECCPU 2006 benchmarks to represent different types of workloads running in the server. We
carefully choose the set of benchmarks in which the system resources are consumed at the same
level. To ensure exactly the same CPU utilization, we repeatedly and simultaneously run each
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benchmark with 16 copies to fully utilize all cores. Also, proven by [123], the memory consumption
of those benchmarks are quite similar. For benchmark 456.hmmer and 462.libquantum, the av-
erage memory utilization is about 24% and 25%, respectively. Moreover, as SPECCPU involves
limited I/O activities, the system resources consumed by the chosen benchmarks are very close
to one another. The experimental results are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
We observe that under the same system utilization, different types of workloads could lead to
different thermal conditions. An almost 6◦C temperature difference is generated by different work-
loads with the same CPU and memory utilizations. According to [123], 462.libquantum consumes
a relatively high memory consumption but produces the minimum outlet temperature increment.
By contrast, 456.hmmer can cause a much higher temperature increment than 462.libquantum,
and 465.tonto raises the outlet temperature more than 7◦C while consuming the least amount of
memory. The main reason could be that the types and ratios of instructions composing the bench-
marks are different. Although the system utilization is the same, the underlying pipeline flows are
actually very different. The ratio of different types of instructions, the probability of branch predic-
tion, and the data dependence could be very different. Those differences further cause CPU halt
and leave functional units idle, resulting in generating different amounts of heat. We also observe
the zigzag shape of the temperature dynamics of 456.hmmer. The reason is that multiple copies
repeatedly run together to keep generating heat; however, they do not finish at the same time.
In the gap between the first end of one copy and the start of next round, the system utilization is
reduced, resulting in less heat generation.
2.2.3 Power Consumption
Heat is generated when currents flow through resistors, obeying the Joule-Lenz law. Consequently,
power consumption, which represents the rate of energy transformation, is closely related to heat
generation. The heat in joules can be given by:
H = I2Rt = Pt, (2.1)
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Figure 2.5: Power Consumption of Two Benchmarks.
where I is the current, R is the resistance, and t is the time. From the equation, we can see that the
heat generation is linearly increased to the power consumption. Using the results obtained from the
same set of SPECCPU 2006 experiments conducted above, we present the power consumptions
of 456.hmmer and 462.libquantum in Figure 2.5. As the benchmark that raises to almost 7◦C
higher than 462.libquantum, on average 456.hmmer also consumes almost 70W more power than
462.libquantum. Both theory analysis and experimental results indicate that running a power-
intensive workload ensures more heat, which could be exploited for mounting a thermal attack.
This result (i.e., 70W difference in power consumption) also forms the basis for the configuration
of one parameter in our large-scale experimental evaluation.
2.2.4 Heating Speed
We further measure the speed to heat a server. Unlike a power stimulus that surges instanta-
neously, the temperature dynamics is a process of heat accumulation. We choose HPL with a
block size of 50 as the thermal-intensive workload. We run the workload for 30 minutes and then
stop it. In the first 10 minutes, the temperature starts to increase quickly. Then, although the
temperature is still raising, the speed drops. The dynamics of the server’s outlet temperature is
illustrated in Figure 2.6. The temperature starts to increase quickly in the first 10 minutes. The
temperature can increase about 6.8◦C higher than that of the idle state. Then, although the tem-
perature is still raising, the speed drops. After we stop the workload, the cooling system can quickly
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Figure 2.6: Temperatures with HPL Running and Stopping.
decrease the temperature in the first several minutes. The temperature drops almost 4.5◦C within
the first five minutes and 6◦C within the first 10 minutes. However, after 10 minutes, the speed to
dissipate the heat slows down considerably. Even after half an hour, the outlet temperature still
cannot return to the original value at the idle state, which implies that the full dissipation of heat
requires quite a long time. Overall, we have two major observations: (1) the temperature of a
server varies quickly when a thermal-intensive workload starts/stops; and (2) the dynamics of the
server temperature is non-linear.
2.3 Thermal Attack
In this section, we first describe our threat model. We then mount thermal attacks on both virtual-
ized and non-virtualized environments, as well as a pulsation attack. Based on the attack results,
we further conduct damage assessment.
2.3.1 Threat Model
A thermal attack can be launched at the server level, rack level, or data center level. We assume
that the target data center has the following features. (1) It is cooled by traditional CRAC cooling
systems with optimal cooling policies deployed to maximize cooling efficiency, i.e., the supply air
temperature is set as high as possible to save energy while keeping the inlet temperature below
a redline threshold. (2) It provides utility-based computing services that are accessible over the
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Internet. (3) Thermal sensors are equipped in the data center, and temperature monitoring is
conducted at the rack level. Note that most current data centers have just a few thermal probes
for the entire data center, and only some experimental data centers (like HP Labs) have about 2-4
thermal sensors per rack. (4) Like most current data centers, the target data center also deploys
power oversubscription.
The attacker could be an individual, a competitor of a cloud service provider, or a cybercrime
organization. The attacker does not require more privileges than a regular user to access the
target cloud service, and no compromised hypervisor is required. This is mainly due to the fact
that in a cloud environment, especially IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) and PaaS (Platform as a
Service), a tenant has the privilege to run any workloads/applications at the guest level, including
the benchmarks used in our measurement study. While those workloads are developed to assess
the performance of specific scenarios, different combinations and configurations of them compose
thermal-intensive workloads.
However, the attacker might utilize the publicly available information or network probing to figure
out the network topology inside a cloud [98], and exploit more advanced probing techniques to
achieve tenant co-residence in the same physical server or rack [122]. Moreover, the attacker could
run advanced thermal-intensive programs (e.g., power virus [46, 47]), instead of regular thermal-
intensive workloads, to further exaggerate the heat generation.
Note that a more tangible goal of a thermal attack is not to shut down an entire data center, but
to cause a cooling failure in a data center, in which some victim servers are forced to shut down.
Under a thermal attack, much more heat will be generated than normal. Once the heat released
into the hot aisle surpasses the recyclability of a cooling machine, the inlet temperature increases.
The raising of the inlet temperature will further increase the outlet temperature and generate more
heat. Such a vicious cycle will finally lead to a cooling failure. Moreover, the overheat caused by
thermal attacks will reduce the performance and reliability of victim servers, increase the possibility
of hardware failures, and force the data center to reset its cooling configuration, resulting in a much
higher cooling cost.
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Figure 2.7: Thermal Attack on a Non-Virtualized Environment.
2.3.2 Non-virtualized Environments
In this scenario, we assume that an attacker owns a dedicated host (e.g., a dedicated instance in
Amazon EC2) in a data center. As the attacker can choose any workload to run at will, the attack
vector is straightforward, running thermal-intensive workloads for a relatively long time.
As reported in [25], the average system utilization of most servers in a data center is between
20 - 30%. We also assume that the victim server is running moderate workloads with 25% system
utilization. We choose benchmark 462.libquantum to represent a moderate workload. Although
462.libquantum belongs to the CPU-intensive benchmark suite, it is highly vectorizable. The high-
dimensional matrix computation requires more I/O operations and makes 462.libquantum con-
sume less power consumption than other SPECCPU benchmarks like 456.hmmer, as shown in
Figure 2.5.
The thermal attack starts after the victim server running the moderate workload for 30 minutes.
The attacker first pushes the system utilization to 100%. The first attack phase lasts 30 minutes.
After the utilization reaches its cap, the attacker replaces the moderate workload with the thermal-
intensive workload to further heat the server. In this attack, we use a combination of SPECCPU
456.hmmer and HPL with a block size set of 50 to represent the thermal-intensive workload. Again,
the attack lasts about 30 minutes.
The dynamics of the server’s outlet temperature is shown in Figure 2.7(a). At the beginning,
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Figure 2.8: Margin Temperature of Thermal Attacks on a Virtualized Environment.
the moderate workload runs at an average of 25% utilization in the server. The outlet temper-
ature of this phase is 32◦C. On the next phase, the moderate workload pushes the server into
the cap utilization. With fully utilized system sources, the outlet temperature reaches 34◦C. Since
the difference is less than 2◦C, the cooling control system can handle it without any trouble. In
the final phase, under the thermal-intensive workloads, the outlet temperature is rapidly raised to
more than 38◦C, which is 6◦C higher than the temperature under the moderate workload. Even
under the same utilization, it is evident that malicious thermal-intensive workloads can generate
a significant temperature rise and emit a large amount of heat to the computer room. We also
show the temperature of the first core in our testbed under the thermal attack on a non-virtualized
environment in Figure 2.7(b), which clearly demonstrates the significant temperature increase of
the core under the thermal attack.
2.3.3 Virtualized Environments
Most computing services provided by clouds run in virtualized environments, except for dedicated
hosting services. A simple approach tomounting a thermal attack is to rent a cloud instance and run
thermal-intensive workloads in a VM, regardless of cloud service models (e.g., SaaS (Software as
a Service), PaaS, and IaaS). However, only in IaaS can attackers achieve tenant co-residence and
fully control the running workloads. Thus, the effective attack vector in a virtualized environment is
21
to subscribe one or multiple VM(s) in one physical host and then run thermal-intensive workloads
at the same time.
We emulate the IaaS services by running four VMs on our testbed, each VM allocated with 4GB
memory and 4 vCPUs, under Xen hypervisor, which is the same hypervisor running in Amazon
EC2. We run all VMs with 25% utilization as our baseline for representing a normal case. Then we
select one or more VM(s) with designed workloads running to exhaust the host resources. In our
controlled VM(s), we run the following thermal-intensive workloads: (1) SPECCPU 456.hmmer, (2)
HPL with the block size set to 200 and N set to 10,000, and (3) a combination of 456.hmmer, HPL
and TPCC-UVa. Figure 2.8(a) shows the attack results.
While the outlet temperature is about 33◦C under the baseline condition, some attacks can
raise the temperature to almost 37◦C. The attacks running HPL, 456.hmmer and TPCC-UVa, which
ensure both CPU and I/O intensive workloads, can lead to about a 16◦C margin temperature. With
just one malicious VM controlled, an attacker can raise the temperature by almost 4◦C higher than
that of the baseline within 10 minutes.
Recent research shows that it is still relatively easy to achieve tenant co-residence in public
clouds. When an attacker can run multiple VMs on the same physical machine, it can mount a
more powerful thermal attack. We measure the temperature of the host when different numbers
of VMs run thermal-intensive workloads. The results in Figure 2.8(b) clearly demonstrate that with
more VMs controlled, a thermal attack can heat the server to a higher temperature. Also, a thermal
attack on three VMs can lead to about a 5◦C higher temperature than the baseline case. However,
once all CPU resources are already fully utilized in a physical machine (under four VMs in our
experiment), running even more VMs in the same machine cannot achieve a significant difference
in heating generation.
In our experiment, we assume that VM live migration is not adopted in the target data center,
and the attackers can run thermal-intensive workloads on the target server/VMs to reach full system
utilization. This assumption is valid because VM live migration has not yet been widely adopted in
real clouds, and live migration suffers non-negligible downtime on the migrated VMs running with
intensive workloads. Note that if VM live migration is enabled, the process of live migration can
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Figure 2.9: Margin Temperature of Pulsation and Continuous Attacks.
cause a sharp rise of power consumption on both source and destination servers [123]. Such a
power spike may trip a circuit breaker and result in a power outage.
2.3.4 Pulsation Thermal Attack
Based on our measurement results, the heat cannot be emitted immediately, and the temperature
dynamics is non-linear. Thus, attackers can heat the targeted server within a certain amount of
time and then pause for a while, and repeat this on/off heat pattern for many times. We call such an
on/off heat strategy a pulsation thermal attack. Using the same HPL benchmark with the block size
of 50 and the problem size of 40,000, we mount both a pulsation thermal attack and a continuous
thermal attack. The results are shown in Figure 2.9.
In comparison with the continuous attack, on one hand, the pulsation attack can reach almost
the same maximum temperature, with about 0.56◦C lost; but over the entire attack duration, the
difference of average temperature between these two attacks is about 1.8◦C, which means that
less heat is generated by the pulsation attack.
On the other hand, in the pulsation attack, the temperature variation can be as large as 6◦C in
15 minutes, which is much higher than that of the continuous attack. A recent work [38] reports
that a high variability in temperature has a stronger effect on hardware reliability. Based on their
observations, the probability of hardware failure is almost double when the CoV (coefficient of
variation) in temperature is bigger than 0.0074. We list the CoV in temperature of these two attacks
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Table 2.1: CoV.
Attack CoV
Continuous 0.0071
Pulsation 0.0440
in Table 2.1. It clearly shows that the CoV of the pulsation attack is much larger than both 0.0074
and that of the continuous attack. Thus, a pulsation attack will have a less chance to cause local
hotspots and cooling failures but degrade its end-host’s hardware reliability more seriously than its
continuous counterpart.
Moreover, the attack cost of a pulsation attack is lower than that of a continuous attack, es-
pecially for those attacks on SaaS platforms such as web servers. Besides the periodic style,
a pulsation attack can also be launched with random intervals to avoid specific traffic patterns,
making the pulsation attack harder to detect.
While our current attack vector is to simply run thermal-intensive workloads on IaaS platforms,
there are many other potential attack vectors on different platforms (e.g, PaaS and SaaS). For
instance, as shown in the previous work [117], random webpage requests can cause significant
cache misses and then consume much more energy. Such a feature could also be exploited in
thermal attacks. We will explore more effective attack vectors in our future work.
2.3.5 Damage Analysis
We use several most common temperature induced intrinsic hard failure mechanisms, including
electromigration, time dependent dielectric breakdown, thermal cycling and disk failure [36, 101,
107], to analyze the reliability degradation caused by a thermal attack. We use λ to represent the
failure rate of each failure mechanism.
Electromigration (EM). EM is induced by the gradual movement of the ions in a conductor as
a result of the momentum transfer between electrons and the diffusing metal atoms [9]. Hardware
failures including the opening of metal lines/contacts, shorts between adjacent metal lines, or metal
levels or junctions could be caused by EM. Equation 2.2 gives the EM failure rate (λEM ), which is
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commonly based on Black’s model.
λEM = A0(J − Jcrit)−ne(−Ea/kT ) (2.2)
where A0 is a constant that is empirically determined, J represents the current density, Jcrit is the
threshold current density, Ea is a material dependent constant representing the activation energy,
and k is Boltzmann’s constant.
Time dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB). TDDB occurs when the gate oxide breaks
down due to low electric fields. It causes the formation of conductive paths through dielectrics.
The model is defined in Equation 2.3. The parameters are similar to those of EM.
λTDDB = A0e
γEoxe(−Ea/kT ) (2.3)
Thermal cycling (TC). The large difference in thermal expansion coefficients of silicon sub-
strate and other materials, which causes thermal cycling (TC), eventually leads to permanent fail-
ures, such as the creation of cracks, fractures, short circuits, die interface, and more. The effects
of low frequency cycling can be modeled via the Coffin-Mason equation [62].
λTC = C0(∆T −∆To)−q, (2.4)
where ∆T is the temperature difference, q is a material dependent Coffin Manson exponent with a
common value ranging from 1 to 9. ∆To is the portion of the temperature cycle range in the elastic
region and could be dropped since it is usually much less than the temperature cycling range.
Disk failure. For damage analysis on a disk due to elevated temperatures, we use the model
build in [101], which is derived from the Arrhenius equation. Since our testbed does not contain an
embedded sensor for monitoring disk temperature, we analyze the thermal impact on the lifetime
of a disk based on the outlet temperature, which should be lower than the actual disk temperature.
λdisk = Ae
(−Ea/kT ) (2.5)
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(a) CPU Damage. (b) Disk Damage.
Figure 2.10: Attack on a Non-Virtualized Environment.
We use the reliability model in RAMP (Reliability-Aware MicroProcessors) [107], which as-
sumes that all individual failures are independent. We add up all the individual failure rates and
compute the MTTF (Mean-Time-To-Failure) as 1/λ.
Our model is calibrated so that the default MTTF is set to 10 years under normal conditions
as previous hardware reliability research such as [64]. While different hardware with different
technology could possess different lifetimes, the trend remains similar. Therefore, we normalize
all results to minimize the calibration error.
We use the temperature of all CPU cores to estimate the CPU reliability. The normalized results
of impacts upon reliability are illustrated in Figure 2.10, where Figure 2.10(a) indicates the core
damages while Figure 2.10(b) shows the disk failure. The average bar represents the first phase
where the testbed is running moderate workloads with average utilization. The second phase is
represented as “cap”, which means the utilization has reached the cap utilization. The “attack”
bar represents the last phase where thermal-intensive workloads are running. We can see that
when the system utilization reaches a certain cap, the increased temperature affects the hardware
reliabilities. However, under thermal attacks, the hardware reliabilities are seriously degraded.
Figure 2.11 shows the impact of thermal attacks on a virtualized environment. Even with just
one VM controlled, the reliability of the host suffers much degradation, with almost a half reduction
of the baseline case. Figure 2.12 shows the dynamics of MTTF under thermal attacks with different
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Figure 2.11: Attack on a Virtualized Envi-
ronment.
Figure 2.12: Attack with Various Numbers
of VMs.
numbers of VMs, indicating that the reliability would suffer more degradation with more VMs under
malicious control.
Soft errors. High temperature could also negatively affect the soft errors, which will happen
if the collected charge at a junction is equal to the critical charge. The critical charge represents
the minimum charge to flip the bit in the cell. It was observed that the increase of temperature
decreases the value of the critical charge [32,66], making the occurrence of soft errors more prob-
able.
2.4 Attacks on Data Centers
The damage of thermal attacks is not limited to victim servers. Thermal attacks also change the
surrounding environmental temperature of these victim servers, and thus impacting the thermal
conditions of the entire computer room, as well as the thermal performance of other servers and
the cooling costs of the data center. To evaluate the impact of thermal attack at the data center
level, we conduct a trace-driven simulation based on computational fluid dynamics (CFD), a pow-
erful mechanical fluid dynamic analysis approach that can be used to simulate the air recirculation
conditions in the data center. We assume that the simulated data center is equipped with air-
cooling CRACs. Also, the data center has adopted a smart workload scheduling policy (e.g., [75]),
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so that the supply air temperature set point can be set higher for minimizing cooling costs, as
suggested in [38].
For the data center layout, we use a standard layout with alternating hot and cold aisles, as
illustrated in Figure 2.1. The cold air goes under the raised floor and enters the cold aisle through
perforated tiles to cool down the servers. Note that the standard data center layout has been
designed to minimize the air recirculation effect. Other data center structures could result in worse
damages under a thermal attack. We assume that the targeted data center has one computer room,
which contains four rows of servers, with eight racks in each row. Each rack contains 40 servers,
totaling 1,280 servers. The volumetric flow rate of the intake air is set to 0.0068m3/s for each
server. The rate for a CRAC unit to push chilled air into a raised floor plenum is 9,000ft3/min. We
use a widely adopted CFD package, Fluent [4], to simulate the thermal environment under different
workload distributions, and then get the percentage of heat flow recirculated among the servers.
Based on the CFD analysis [110], the air recirculation effect among different servers can be
modeled as follows:
KiT
i
out =
N∑
j=1
hjiKjT
j
out + (Ki −
N∑
j=1
hjiKj)Tsup + Pi, (2.6)
T iin =
N∑
j=1
hji ∗ (T jout − Tsup) + Tsup, (2.7)
where T iout represents the outlet temperature of server i. Ki is a multiplicative factor representing
the air density and the air flow rate. The air recirculation is described with h. T iin and Tsup represent
the inlet temperature of server i and the supply air temperature of CRAC cooling units, respectively.
Pi is the power consumption of server i. The outlet temperature of a server is impacted by the air
recirculation from server j to server i, the cooling effect of the supplied cooling air, and the power
consumption of server i. Equation 2.7 indicates that the supply air temperature and the recirculation
heat, together, determine the inlet temperature. The power consumption also contributes to the
thermal condition in the data center.
We use a server trace file from one of the largest cloud service vendors in our simulation,
which contains the average CPU utilization of 5,415 servers in every 15 minutes for one week. We
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Figure 2.13: Thermal Attacks on a Rack Significantly Reduces the Server MTTF. A Hotspot Attack
is Shown to be More Effective Because of Its Consideration of Air Recirculation.
conduct the thermal attack based on the results from our server-level experiments. We assume
the server consumes 100W of idle power and 300W when fully utilized with moderate workloads.
As illustrated in Figure 2.5, by running some thermal-extensive workloads, the power consumption
can become higher than that of running moderate workloads, even when the utilization is the same.
The difference could be as large as 70W. In our attacks, we conservatively assume that thermal-
intensive workload consumes 60W more than the normal cases.
2.4.1 Rack-level Attack
We have shown that a thermal attack can significantly raise the temperature of the targeted server.
Here we first evaluate the impact of a thermal attack on a server rack. In the rack environment, air
recirculation causes servers to affect the temperatures of one another. As a result of heat flows,
different rack locations lead to different temperature impacts. For example, servers at the bottom
of the rack might have smaller impacts because cold air is supplied from the raised floor and flows
upward to the ceiling vents. As result, the bottom servers normally have lower temperatures. To
consider the thermal effects of air recirculation, we compare three attack strategies for a rack:
(1) hotspot attack; (2) non-hotspot attack; and (3) random attack. In a hotspot attack, we mainly
attack servers that have larger impacts on the rack (e.g., at the top of the rack) and so it is easier
to create hotspots. In a non-hotspot attack, we focus on servers located in the position with small
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thermal effects (e.g., at the rack bottom). In a random attack, we randomly choose servers to
attack. We attack different numbers of servers in one rack and leave other servers in the idle state.
As introduced in Section 2.3.5, the temperature rise affects the hardware failure rate. We thus
conduct a hardware failure analysis using EM, TDDB, and disk failure to assess the thermal attack
on a rack. We use the same parameters and reliability model as Section 2.3.5.
Figure 2.13 illustrates the results (normalized to those of conducting no attacks). We can see
that the average server MTTF is reduced when more servers are under attack. For example, with
about 10 servers under attack, thermal attacks can enlarge the failure rate by ∼10% for all servers
in a rack, resulting in a normalized MTTF of ∼90%. When 30 servers are attacked, the normalized
MTTF drops to 75%. Among the three types of attack, the hotspot attack causes the most damage
as those positions can maximize the thermal effects. It indicates that air recirculation indeed affects
the server thermal conditions even in a single rack.
2.4.2 Datacenter-level Attack
2.4.2.1 Attack scenarios
Since the knowledge of air recirculation can make a difference, we now consider three types of
attackers. In the first case, the attacker does not have any knowledge about the target data center,
such as the position of the servers or the layout of the data center. Such attackers just randomly
choose a certain number of servers to launch thermal attacks. To evaluate this kind of attacks, we
randomly attack different numbers of victim servers in the target data center, and call them random
thermal attacks.
Unlike the first type, the second type of attacker owns some advanced networking intrusion
knowledge, but still does not know the data center layout. Those advanced attackers could launch
more powerful thermal attacks by exploiting side-channel techniques. For example, by repeatedly
creating instances and checking IP addresses or using networking probe techniques, an advanced
attacker can achieve co-residence on one rack. We assume that the selection of the racks for
mounting a rack-level thermal attack is random. To evaluate those advanced attack scenarios, we
conduct rack-level thermal attacks on one or a few randomly selected racks with massive thermal-
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(d) 50 Servers under Attack.
Figure 2.14: Cooling Costs in the Data Center under Different Types of Thermal Attacks.
intensive workloads. We call such attacks rack-level thermal attacks.
In the third case, attackers may gain much knowledge of the target data center via various
approaches. For example, they could know the overall physical layout of the target data center
through either public documents or network probing. Also, via an elaborately long-term observation
of servers in the target data center, the attackers may roughly infer where the hotspots could be
and whether a server is located in a hotspot, as well as the load balancing policy possibly adopted
by the data center. Though somewhat costly to acquire, such knowledge can largely expand the
damage of a sophisticated thermal attack and be devastating to the data center. We evaluate these
well-planned attack scenarios to understand the consequences. In such attacks, we assume that
an attacker can roughly pinpoint the positions of the target servers, and call them hotspot thermal
attacks.
2.4.2.2 Impacts on cooling costs
Thermal attacks not only damage the hardware, but can also generate local hotspots in the com-
puter room. Those servers located in a hotspot suffer higher environmental temperatures than
others. A local hotspot can further affect the entire data center. To eliminate any local hotspots,
the data center has to decrease the supply air temperature set point. Otherwise, the hotspot might
cause cooling system failures. We first investigate the impacts of a thermal attack on the cooling
costs. As mentioned above, existing data centers normally deploy aggressive cooling energy sav-
ing strategies to reduce cooling costs. The temperature raised by a thermal attack can force the
targeted data center to change the cooling conditions, thus increasing the cooling electricity bills.
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We assume that the targeted data center is equipped with intelligent cooling adjustment mecha-
nisms, where the supply air temperature set point is automatically adjusted as high as possible, in
order to keep the inlet temperatures of all servers below the redline threshold. Note that such an
intelligent cooling system is not yet adopted in most of today’s production data centers due to their
incapability of conducting thermal monitoring for individual servers. We assume such a system to
investigate the impacts of thermal attack on even a data center with advanced cooling systems.
We estimate the cooling cost based on the power consumption of traditional CRACs, which
relies on the cooling coefficient of performance (COP) and the power consumption of all servers.
It can be calculated as follows,
PCRAC =
Pserver
COP
, (2.8)
where Pserver is the power consumption of all the servers. COP characterizes the cooling efficiency
of a CRAC system. According to [23], the COP could be further acquired based on the supply air
temperature, Tsup,
COP=0.0068× T 2sup + 0.0008× Tsup + 0.458. (2.9)
We conduct three types of thermal attacks (i.e, random, rack-level, and hotspot thermal attacks)
on the targeted data center with different numbers of servers under attack. In thermal attacks, the
position of the attacked servers plays an important role because of the air recirculation in the
computer room. However, only in a hotspot thermal attack, an attacker can have control on the
selection of racks and servers for mounting the attack. Due to the random selection of servers
or racks in the random or rack-level thermal attacks, we conduct both attacks for 10 times and
average the results. For the hotspot thermal attacks, we choose those servers located in hotspots,
which have the largest thermal effects on the entire room.
Figure 2.14 shows the cooling costs under the three types of thermal attacks with different
numbers of attacked servers, indicating that thermal attacks can significantly increase the cooling
costs. Even with only 20 servers under a thermal attack, which is less than 2% of all servers, the
cooling costs increase by about 5∼20% on average. The attack becomes more powerful with more
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Figure 2.15: A Snapshot of a Thermal Attack on One Block of Servers.
servers under attack. For example, when 50 servers are under attack, the data center has to pay
58% more cooling costs compared to the normal case.
Among those three types of attacks, the hotspot attack again consumes the highest cooling
costs compared to the other two attacks. It indicates that the locations of the attacked servers
indeed impact the effectiveness of thermal attacks. Due to air recirculation, servers in specific
locations can be used to magnify the heat generated by the attack. We can also see that the rack-
level attack consumes more cooling costs than the random attack. The reason lies in the fact that,
by attacking adjacent servers, the heat can be easily accumulated to form a local hotspot, forcing
the data center to lower the temperature set point of the cooling system, resulting in higher cooling
costs.
2.4.2.3 Cooling failures
A snapshot view. We simulate thermal attacks using the server trace obtained from one of the
largest cloud service vendors. The targeted data center is supposed to have a smart scheduler
that performs load balancing and adjusts the supply air temperature of CRACs in the room, with
the minimum supply air temperature of 16◦C [100]. The redline threshold for the inlet temperature
is set to 25◦C, which is higher than the set points used in most existing data centers. We simu-
late thermal attacks with thermal-intensive workloads. As shown in Figure 2.6 in Section 2.2, the
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(a) Normal Condition. (b) Thermal Attacks.
Figure 2.16: The Global Views of Thermal Conditions in a Computer Room.
temperature can be raised within 10 minutes. In our attack simulation, we gradually increase the
number of attacked servers with a period of 15 minutes. The simulation results are presented in
Figure 2.15, where Figure 2.15(a) shows the dynamics of the inlet temperature of our server block,
which contains 10 servers. Figure 2.15(b) shows the dynamics of the supply air temperature of the
CRACs. Before the attack starts, the supply air temperature set point is configured to 20◦C. Once
the thermal attack starts, the heat generated by the thermal attack forces the CRACs to gradually
lower the temperature set point. As more and more servers go under attack, the temperature set
point is decreased to 16◦C. Finally, the cooling system fails to cool down the hotspot generated by
the thermal attack. To avoid hardware damage, 10 servers are forced to shut down. A few minutes
later, since no more heat is being generated, the scheduler adjusts the supply air temperature set
point back to 17.3◦C.
Global views. Figure 2.16 demonstrates the global views of thermal conditions in the targeted
data center. Each block contains 10 servers and four blocks stack up as a rack. The level indicates
the position of a block in a rack. For example, the level 4 means the block locates at the top of
the rack. The supply air temperature is fixed as 16◦C. The attacker first increases the utilization
of controlled servers to the capping limit by running moderate workloads. Under this scenario as
shown in Figure 2.16(a), the targeted data center still stays in a health thermal condition: the block
with the highest temperature is about 22◦C. After that, the attacker switches all moderate work-
loads to thermal-intensive workloads. As Figure 2.16(b) shows, although all servers’ utilizations
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Figure 2.17: Number of Servers to Cause a Cooling Failure under Different Supply Air Tempera-
ture.
remain unchanged, the thermal condition seriously deteriorates. The inlet temperature of multiple
blocks at the right corner is approaching the redline threshold, and one of them already surpasses
the redline temperature (25◦C). Such results indicate that existing utilization-based load balance
cannot defend against thermal attacks.
Attack efficiency. We further explore the efficiency of different attack scenarios. We check the
number of servers needed to successfully cause a local cooling system failure. We consider three
scenarios: high, medium, and low, representing background workload utilizations around 60%,
40% and 20%, respectively, in the data center. We also consider the impacts of different supply air
temperature. While the result for the hotspot attack is deterministic, for the random and rack-level
attacks, due to the randomness in the or rack selection, we conduct each type of attack ten times
and take the average. All the results are shown in Figure 2.17. It is clear that, with the same
supply air temperature (e.g., 16◦C), the hotspot attack requires the smallest number of attacked
servers (e.g., 30-50) to cause a local cooling failure. Also, we are not surprised to see that the
rack-level attack achieves much higher attack efficiency than the random attack, even though the
rack selection is random. For a random attack, a large number of servers are required to cause
a local cooling failure. That is reasonable as the cooling facility in a data center is designed to
support all servers even if some of them may experience high power consumption at the same
time. However, under extreme conditions, it is still possible to cause local hotspots even when the
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Table 2.2: Attack Efficiency on a Large Data Center.
Low Medium High
Rack-level 608 556 292
CRAC cooling system is working properly.
The results further suggest that a thermal attack is more effective when the data center workload
is in the high scenario, where the data center is already in a hot environment. Thus, by running
thermal intensive workloads in the high scenario, it is easier to exhaust the remainder cooling
redundancy and cause a cooling failure. As the usage of data centers normally follows specific
patterns and might be leaked by side-channels, it is not difficult for a well-motivated attacker to
detect the occurrence of the high scenario.
Figure 2.17 illustrates the number of servers needed to cause a cooling failure under different
supply air temperature. It also clearly indicates that the higher the supply air temperature set by
data centers, the smaller efforts are needed for attackers to cause cooling failures. More specif-
ically, with the supply air temperature raising by 1◦C (e.g., from 16◦C to 17◦C), the number of
required servers is reduced to half. These results imply that although a higher temperature set
point of the cooling system is able to significantly lower the cooling costs, as suggested in [38], this
management strategy also makes a data center more vulnerable to thermal attacks. While cloud
vendors might like a data center hot to reduce cooling cost, malicious attackers will also like the
data center hot to much more easily launch a thermal attack. Thus, if today’s data centers should
continue raising their temperature, thermal attacks would become a serious threat to these future
more cooling-efficient data centers.
Extension to a larger scale. We extend the data center model to include 10,240 servers to
evaluate the impacts of thermal attacks in a larger scale. For hotspot attacks, we achieve quite
similar results as before: with the knowledge of the locations of controlled servers, just tens of
servers are enough to cause a local hotspot. We list the results of rack-level attacks in Table 2.2.
As we can see, if the attacker can achieve rack-level co-residence, controlling 5% of servers is
sufficient to cause a cooling failure. Note that the rack selection is still random in this rack-level
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attack model. Thus, it is feasible for an advanced attacker to cause a local hotspot and even a
cooling failure in a large data center. Moreover, such a potential threat would be more serious in
the future given the fact that cloud vendors have been continuing to deploy more servers in their
data centers to meet the rapidly increasing cloud service demands.
Financial losses caused by cooling failures. Cooling failures are devastating to cloud ven-
dors and various services hosted in their data centers. Since one physical server could be shared
by dozens of VMs in a cloud environment, the shutdown of even a single server would lead to the
disruption of many services and significant financial losses. It is reported that the four-hour outage
of Amazon Web Services S3 in February 2017 caused an incredible loss of $150 million for S&P
500 enterprises, plus with a loss of $160 million for U.S. financial services [2]. In 2016, Delta Airline
also suffered a loss of $150 million in a five-hour disruption of their data center [6].
2.4.3 Attack Cost Analysis
The cost of mounting a thermal attack against a data center mainly lies in subscribing the computing
services offered in the data center, in which the dedicated server hosting is the most expensive
service and its usage sets the upper-limit of the attack cost. A dedicated server service enables a
client to own an entire physical server without any resource sharing with others, allowing a thermal
attack to be mounted by fully exploiting its computing sources for heat generation.
The price of an Amazon EC2 dedicated server with 20 Cores is $1.84 per hour [1]. Assume
that each thermal attack uses 50/100/400 dedicated servers and lasts 60 minutes as our simula-
tion results show the cooling failure occurs within one hour of the thermal attack being launched.
Therefore, to own 50/100/400 dedicated servers for one hour, the attacker just needs to pay
$92/$184/$736, for mounting a hotspot attack, a rack-level attack, or a random attack, respec-
tively. However, based on our simulation results, such thermal attacks are powerful enough to
cause a cooling failure in a computer room with 1,280 servers.
Compared with service subscription costs, the other costs for mounting a thermal attack is
minor. Although it is technically challenging, there is no extra financial cost for conducting advanced
network probing to explore the layout of a data center. Even if VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) has been
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deployed to lower the risk of tenant co-residence, a recent work proposes cost-effective attack
strategies to achieve co-residence without much cost. For example, it just costs 14 cents to have
a more than 90 percent chance of achieving co-residence on Google Computing Engine [112].
2.5 Defense Approaches
The root cause of thermal attacks is the adoption of aggressive cooling energy saving policies in the
data centers, which results in heavily reduced cooling redundancies. Although this thermal vulner-
ability cannot be completely fixed without the increase of cooling redundancies, a well-designed
load balancing strategy could mitigate the thermal attacks. Obviously, the traditional utilization-
based load balancing strategy cannot effectively defend against a thermal attack, as shown in
Section 2.2. The previous temperature-based load balancing approaches (e.g., [84]) relying on
a static thermal profile running with normal workloads cannot ward off the threat either. This is
because the thermal conditions could be dramatically changed due to thermal attacks, even com-
pletely opposite to the static pre-calculated profile. The absence of fine-grained sensors further
limits the effectiveness of those approaches.
Note that a high power consumption process or high temperature core not only affects itself, but
also impacts its neighboring servers. Thus, without a global knowledge of the thermodynamics in
a computer room, any single server based capping mechanism (e.g., power capping) alone cannot
fully address the security threat posed by thermal attacks.
To mitigate the thermal attacks, we propose a dynamic thermal-aware load balancing approach
at the rack and data center levels. Our thermal-aware load balancing allocates workloads with the
consideration of the thermal conditions and physical locations of servers. Based on the thermal
condition in a rack or the entire data center, thermal-intensive workloads would be dynamically
distributed to servers to limit their thermal impacts. Such a mechanism can effectively mitigate the
negative impacts of a local hotspot, allowing further actions like dynamic voltage and frequency
scaling to be taken inside the local hotspot for temperature reduction.
We implement a simple prototype of the proposed thermal-aware load balancing mechanism
and conduct one experiment to demonstrate its effectiveness. In our prototype, wemaintain a list of
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Figure 2.18: Inlet Temperature of a Local Hotspot.
spots that have large air recirculation effects, especially under thermal attacks, due to their physical
locations. The VMs of these spots are less likely to be allocated to users. The configuration of the
targeted data center is the same as Section 2.4. The initial system utilization is 25%.
In our experiment, we conduct a thermal attack using thermal-intensive workloads that con-
sume 20% more power consumption than regular workloads. The attacker gradually increases
the number of servers under attack. We fix the supply air temperature as 16◦C. We measure
the inlet temperature of the local hotspot that has the highest temperature under different number
of attack servers. The result is illustrated in Figure 2.18, in which the “+” line indicates the re-
sults using thermal-aware load balancing and the “x” line represents the results under the original
utilization-based load balancing policy. Whereas the cooling system cannot keep the hotspot be-
low the redline threshold using the original policy, our simple thermal-aware load balancing is able
to lower the temperature by more than 1◦C and keep the hotspot safe under the thermal attack.
Overall, the proposed thermal-aware load balancing is simple and straightforward to implement,
and it can significantly improve the robustness of a data center against thermal attacks. However,
in an oversubscribed data center, such a reactive thermal management will still fail to handle much
more severe attacks with much more servers running malicious thermal-intensive workloads simul-
taneously. In our future work, we plan to pursue more advanced proactive defense strategies to
detect the occurrence of thermal anomalies in real-time and prevent potential hotspots from over-
heating themselves and surrounding servers. The more effective defense systems are expected to
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have the following capabilities: (1) robust anomaly detection with an emphasis on thermal-intensive
workloads at chip and server levels; (2) cost-effective sensing solutions to profile the thermal dy-
namics by deploying sensors with the consideration of costs, networking traffics, locations and
sense ranges of those additional sensors; and (3) proactive thermal management on rack and
data center levels by exploiting energy storage such as phase change materials [104].
2.6 Related Work
Thermal/power threats. There are some previous works focus on thermal attacks on individual
components of machines. Kong et al. [69] studied thermal attacks on instruction caches. They run
malicious code to heat other places such as the back end of the cache, instead of those traditional
hotspots, and thus avoid the temperature regulation by the dynamic thermal management (DTM).
A heating attack on flash memory devices is studied in [105]. A memory cell inside a memory
array is locally heated up by an inexpensive laser-diode module. As a result, the contents of the
memory can be altered and compromised. Paul et al. [91] launched a thermal attack on disk
storages. They used intensive hot seeks that maximize the power consumption of the disk arm to
rapidly and repeatedly increase the temperature. The disk is throttled due to DTM. Hasan et al. [57]
conducted a heat based attack on Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) by repeatedly accessing a
shared source to create a hotspot in one malicious thread. Thermal covert channel attacks based
on CPU cores’ temperature variations have been presented in [26,82]. While these works provide
a guidance on thermal attacks on individual components, they do not study the impacts of thermal
attacks on servers and data centers.
Wu et al. [117] conducted energy attacks on servers. They manipulated malicious requests
that can cause a large number of cache misses and achieved up to 42.3% power consumption
increment. Xu et al. [123] demonstrated the vulnerability of cloud services to power attack due to
power oversubscription at data centers. An attacker can force victim servers to reach their power
peaks at the same time and then trip the circuit breaker. Islam et al. [61] further proposed using
a hot air recirculation based thermal side channel to infer the power usage of benign users and
then launch power attacks when the aggregated power consumption of benign users is high. Even
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battery-backed data centers are vulnerable to such attacks [74]. Power attack [48] differs from
thermal attack in that power attack attempts to generate a power spike within a very short period
and cause a power outage. In comparison with power attack, thermal attack is more stealthy but
its damage could be as serious as that of power attack. The overheat induced by thermal attack
leads to hardware failure and even shutdown for self-protection.
Cooling in data center. Different cooling strategies in data centers have been proposed in the
past [52,60,77,80,84]. Currently a popular trend is leveraging CFD to simulate the air recirculation
in computing rooms [75]. The introduction of CFD helps a data center to place CRAC and servers
in an efficient way and thus saves cooling cost. However, those cooling strategies only focus on the
optimization of the cooling power in data centers, without considering the risk of a thermal attack.
Impacts of temperature on servers. The impact of temperature on servers has been investi-
gated for years. El-Sayed et al. [38] collected a large amount of field data from different data centers
to study the impact of temperature on hardware reliability. They found that temperature variation
exhibits strong correlation to hardware failures and server outages. Sankar et al. [101] also used a
large collection of data to study the correlation between temperature and hard disk failures. They
reported that temperature is strongly correlated with disk failures. Coskun et al. [36] studied the reli-
ability of different job scheduling and power management methods. They proposed a fine grained
technique to simulate the thermal behaviors and input the thermal trace to the reliability model.
PGCapping [79] integrates various techniques to optimize the multiprocessor performance within
a power cap.
2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a new security threat called thermal attack on data centers.
We first conduct a real server measurement study to systematically investigate the impacts of
different factors on thermal conditions of a physical server. Based on the measurement results, we
propose effective attack vectors to mount thermal attacks on both virtualized and non-virtualized
environments. To evaluate the impacts of thermal attack on a data center, we further simulate rack-
level and datacenter-level thermal attacks under three different attack scenarios using a real-world
41
data center trace. We present the damage analysis at both the server and data center levels. Our
evaluation and analysis results demonstrate that thermal attack can degrade the performance and
reliability of victim servers, cause local hotspots, increase the cooling cost, and even worse lead
to cooling failures, in which some servers are forced to shut down for overheat protection. Finally,
we present a simple thermal-aware load balancing mechanism to help data centers defend against
thermal attacks, which paves the way for more sophisticated defenses.
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Chapter 3
ContainerLeaks: Synergistic Power
Attack via Information Leakage in
Multi-Tenancy Container Cloud
Services
In this chapter, we systematically explore and identify the in-container leakage channels that may
accidentally expose information of host OSes and co-resident containers. Such information leak-
ages include host-system state information (e.g., power consumption, performance data, global
kernel data, and asynchronous kernel events) and individual process execution information (e.g.,
process scheduling, cgroups, and process running status). The distinguishing characteristic infor-
mation exposed at specific timings could help uniquely identify a physical machine. Furthermore,
a malicious tenant may optimize attack strategies and maximize attack effects by acquiring the
system-wide knowledge in advance. We discover these leakage channels in our local testbed on
Docker and LinuX Container (LXC) and verify their (partial) existence on five public commercial
multi-tenancy container cloud services.
In order to reveal the security risks of these leakage channels, we design an advanced attack,
denoted as synergistic power attack, to exploit the seemingly innocuous information leaked through
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these channels. We demonstrate that such information exposure could greatly amplify the attack
effects, reduce the attack costs, and simplify the attack orchestration. Power attacks have proved
to be real threats to existing data centers [74, 123]. With no information of the running status of
underlying cloud infrastructures, existing power attacks can only launch power-intensive workloads
blindly to generate power spikes, with the hope that high spikes could trip branch circuit breakers
to cause power outages. Such attacks could be costly and ineffective. However, by learning
the system-wide status information, attackers can (1) pick the best timing to launch an attack,
i.e., superimpose the power-intensive workload on the existing power spikes triggered by benign
workloads, and (2) synchronize multiple power attacks on the same physical machine/rack by
detecting proximity-residence of controlled containers. We conduct proof-of-concept experiments
on one real-world container cloud service and quantitatively demonstrate that our attack is able to
yield higher power spikes at a lower cost.
We further analyze in depth the root causes of these leakage channels and find that such
exposures are due to the incomplete coverage of container implementation in the Linux kernel.
We propose a two-stage defense mechanism to address this problem in container clouds. In
particular, to defend against the synergistic power attacks, we design and implement a power-
based namespace in the Linux kernel to partition power consumption at a finer-grained (container)
level. We evaluate our power-based namespace from the perspectives of accuracy, security, and
performance overhead. Our experimental results show that our system can neutralize container-
based power attacks with trivial performance overhead.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the background of container tech-
nology and describes existing power attack threats on data centers. Section 3.2 presents the
cross-container leakage channels discovered by us and their leaked information. Section 3.3 de-
tails the synergistic power attack that leverages the leaked information through these channels.
Section 3.4 presents the design and implementation of our power-based namespace on the Linux
kernel. Section 3.5 shows the evaluation of our defense framework from different aspects. Sec-
tion 3.6 discusses the limitations and the future work. Section 3.7 surveys related work, and finally
Section 3.8 concludes.
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3.1 Background
In this section, we briefly describe the background knowledge of three topics: internals of Linux
containers, multi-tenancy container cloud services, and existing power attacks in data centers.
3.1.1 Linux Kernel Support for Container Technology
Containers depend on multiple independent Linux kernel components to enforce isolation among
user-space instances. Compared to VM-based virtualization approaches, multiple containers share
the same OS kernel, thus eliminating additional performance overheads for starting and maintain-
ing VMs. Containers have received much attention from the industry and have grown rapidly in
recent years for boosting application performance, enhancing developer efficiency, and facilitating
service deployment. Here we introduce two key techniques, namespace and cgroup, that enable
containerization on Linux.
3.1.1.1 Namespace
The first namespace was introduced in the Linux kernel 2.4.19. The key idea of namespace is to
isolate and virtualize system resources for a group of processes, which form a container. Each
process can be associated with multiple namespaces of different types. The kernel presents a
customized (based on namespace types) view of system resources to each process. The modi-
fications to any namespaced system resources are confined within the associated namespaces,
thus incurring no system-wide changes.
The current kernel has seven types of namespaces: mount (MNT) namespace, UNIX timeshar-
ing system (UTS) namespace, PID namespace, network (NET) namespace, inter-process commu-
nications (IPC) namespace, USER namespace, andCGROUP namespace. TheMNT namespace
isolates a set of file system mount points. In different MNT namespaces, processes have different
views of the file system hierarchy. The UTS namespace allows each container to have its own
host name and domain name, and thus a container could be treated as an independent node.
The PID namespace virtualizes the process identifiers (pids). Each process has two pids: one pid
within its PID namespace and one (globally unique) pid on the host. Processes in one container
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could only view processes within the same PID namespace. A NET namespace contains separate
virtual network devices, IP addresses, ports, and IP routing tables. The IPC namespace isolates
inter-process communication resources, including signals, pipes, and shared memory. The USER
namespace was recently introduced to isolate the user and group ID number spaces. It creates
a mapping between a root user inside a container to an unprivileged user on the host. Thus,
a process may have full privileges inside a user namespace, but it is de-privileged on the host.
The CGROUP namespace virtualizes the cgroup resources, and each process can only have a
containerized cgroup view via cgroupfs mount and the /proc/self/cgroup file.
3.1.1.2 Cgroup
In the Linux kernel, cgroup (i.e., control group) provides a mechanism for partitioning groups of
processes (and all their children) into hierarchical groups with controlled behaviors. Containers
leverage the cgroup functionality to apply per-cgroup resource limits to each container instance,
thus preventing a single container from draining host resources. Such controlled resources include
CPU, memory, block IO, network, etc. For the billing model in cloud computing, cgroup can also
be used for assigning corresponding resources to each container and accounting for their usage.
Each cgroup subsystem provides a unified sysfs interface to simplify the cgroup operations from
the user space.
3.1.2 Container Cloud
With these kernel features available for resource isolation and management, the Linux kernel can
provide the lightweight virtualization functionality at the OS level. More namespace and cgroup
subsystems are expected to be merged into the upstream Linux kernel in the future to enhance the
container security. Containerization has become a popular choice for virtual hosting in recent years
with the maturity of container runtime software. LXC is the first complete implementation of the
Linux container manager built in 2008. Docker, which was built upon LXC (now with libcontainer),
has become the most popular container management tool in recent years. Docker can wrap ap-
plications and their dependencies (e.g., code, runtime, system tools, and system libraries) into an
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image, thus guaranteeing that application behaviors are consistent across different platforms.
A large number of cloud service providers, including Amazon ECS, IBM Bluemix, Microsoft
Azure, and Google Compute Engine, have already provided container cloud services. For multi-
tenancy container cloud services, containers can either run on a bare metal physical machine or a
virtual machine. In both situations, containers from different tenants share the same Linux kernel
with the host OS.
3.1.3 Power Attacks on Data Centers
Power attacks have been demonstrated to be realistic threats to existing cloud infrastructures
[74, 123]. Considering the cost of upgrading power facilities, current data centers widely adopt
power oversubscription to host the maximum number of servers within the existing power supply
capabilities. The safety guarantees are based on the assumption that multiple adjacent servers
have a low chance of reaching peaks of power consumption simultaneously. While power oversub-
scription allows deploying more servers without increasing power capacity, the reduction of power
redundancy increases the possibility of power outages, which might lead to forced shutdowns for
servers on the same rack or on the same power distribution unit (PDU). Even normal workloads
may generate power spikes that cause power outages. Facebook recently reported that it pre-
vented 18 potential power outages within six months in 2016 [116]. The situation would have been
worse if malicious adversaries intentionally drop power viruses to launch power attacks [46, 47].
The consequence of a power outage could be devastating, e.g., Delta Airlines encountered a shut-
down of a power source in its data center in August 2016, which caused large-scale delays and
cancellations of flights [18]. Recent research efforts [74,123] have demonstrated that it is feasible
to mount power attacks on both traditional and battery-backed data centers.
Launching a successful power attack requires three key factors: (1) gaining access to servers
in the target data center by legitimately subscribing services, (2) steadily running moderate work-
loads to increase the power consumption of servers to their capping limits, (3) abruptly switching
to power-intensive workloads to trigger power spikes. By causing a power spike in a short time
window, a circuit breaker could be tripped to protect servers from physical damages caused by
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overcurrent or overload.
The tripping condition of a circuit breaker depends on the strength and duration of a power
spike. In order to maximize the attack effects, adversaries need to run malicious workloads on a
group of servers belonging to the same rack or PDU. In addition, the timing of launching attacks is
also critical. If a specific set of servers (e.g., on the same rack) in a data center have already run
at their peak power state, the chance of launching a successful power attack will be higher [123].
The techniques of power capping [73] have been designed to defend against power attacks.
At the rack and PDU level, by monitoring the power consumption, a data center can restrict the
power consumption of servers through a power-based feedback loop. At the host level, Running
Average Power Limit (RAPL) is a technique for monitoring and limiting the power consumption
for a single server. RAPL has been introduced by Intel since Sandy Bridge microarchitecture. It
provides fine-grained CPU-level energy accounting at the microsecond level and can be used to
limit the power consumption for one package.
Power capping mechanisms significantly narrow down the power attack surface, but it cannot
address the problem of power oversubscription, which is the root cause of power outages in data
centers. Although host-level power capping for a single server could respond immediately to power
surges, the power capping mechanisms at the rack or PDU level still suffer from minute-level de-
lays. Assuming attackers could deploy power viruses into physically adjacent servers, even if each
server consumes power lower than its power capping limit, the aggregated power consumption of
controlled servers altogether can still exceed the power supply capacity and trip the circuit breaker.
We demonstrate in the following sections that malicious container tenants can launch synergistic
power attacks by controlling the deployment of their power-intensive workloads and leveraging
benign workloads in the background to amplify their power attacks.
3.2 Information Leakages in Container Clouds
As we mentioned in Section 3.1, the Linux kernel provides a multitude of supports to enforce
resource isolation and control for the container abstraction. Such kernel mechanisms are the en-
abling techniques for running containers on the multi-tenancy cloud. Due to priority and difficulty
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Figure 3.1: The Framework for Information Leakage Detection and Cloud Inspection.
levels, some components of the Linux kernel have not yet transformed to support containerization.
We intend to systematically explore which parts of the kernel are left uncovered, what the root
causes are, and how potential adversaries can exploit them.
3.2.1 Container Information Leakages
We first conduct experiments on our local Linux machines with Docker and LXC containers in-
stalled. Linux provides two types of controlled interfaces from userspace processes to the kernel,
system calls, and memory-based pseudo file systems. System calls are mainly designed for user
processes to request kernel services. The system calls have strict definitions for their public inter-
faces and are typically backward compatible. However, memory-based pseudo file systems are
more flexible for extending kernel functionalities (e.g., ioctl), accessing kernel data (e.g., procfs),
and adjusting kernel parameters (e.g., sysctl). In addition, such pseudo file systems enable ma-
nipulating kernel data via normal file I/O operations. Linux has a number of memory-based pseudo
file systems (e.g., procfs, sysfs, devfs, securityfs, debugfs, etc.) that serve the different purposes
of kernel operations. We are more interested in procfs and sysfs, which are by default mounted by
container runtime software.
As illustrated in the left part of Figure 3.1, we design a cross-validation tool to automatically
discover these memory-based pseudo files that expose host information to containers. The key
idea is to recursively explore all pseudo files under procfs and sysfs in two execution contexts, one
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Table 3.1: Leakage Channels in Commercial Container Cloud Services.
Leakage Channels Leakage Information
Potential Vulnerability Container Cloud Services1
Co-re DoS Info leak CC1 CC2 CC3 CC4 CC5
fT`Q+fHQ+Fb Files locked by the kernel ! " ! ! ! ! ! #"
fT`Q+fxQM2BM7Q Physical RAM information ! " ! ! ! ! ! #"
fT`Q+fKQ/mH2b Loaded kernel modules information " " ! ! ! ! ! !
fT`Q+fiBK2`nHBbi Configured clocks and timers ! " ! ! ! ! " !
fT`Q+fb+?2/n/2#m; Task scheduler behavior ! " ! " " ! " !
fT`Q+fbQ7iB`[b Number of invoked softirq handler ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
fT`Q+fmTiBK2 Up and idle time ! " ! ! ! ! ! #"
fT`Q+fp2`bBQM Kernel, gcc, distribution version " " ! ! ! ! ! !
fT`Q+fbii Kernel activities ! ! ! ! ! ! ! #"
fT`Q+fK2KBM7Q Memory information ! ! ! ! ! ! ! "
fT`Q+fHQ/p; CPU and IO utilization over time ! " ! ! ! ! ! #"
fT`Q+fBMi2``mTib Number of interrupts per IRQ ! " ! ! ! ! ! !
fT`Q+f+TmBM7Q CPU information ! " ! ! ! ! ! "
fT`Q+fb+?2/bii Schedule statistics ! " ! ! ! ! ! #"
fT`Q+fbvbf7bf File system information ! " ! ! ! " ! !
fT`Q+fbvbfF2`M2Hf`M/QKf Random number generation info ! " ! ! ! ! ! !
fT`Q+fbvbfF2`M2Hfb+?2/n/QKBMf Schedule domain info ! " ! ! ! ! ! !
fT`Q+f7bf2ti9f Ext4 file system info ! " ! ! ! ! ! !
fbvbf7bf+;`QmTfM2inT`BQf Priorities assigned to traffic ! " ! ! ! " " "
fbvbf/2pB+2bf System device information ! ! ! ! ! ! " "
fbvbf+Hbbf System device information " ! ! ! ! ! " "
running within an unprivileged container and the other running on the host. We align and reorder
the files based on their file paths and then conduct pair-wise differential analysis on the contents
of the same file between these two contexts. If the system resources accessed from a specific
pseudo file has not been namespaced in the Linux kernel, the host and container reach the same
piece of kernel data (as the case of ❷ in Figure 3.1). Otherwise, if properly namespaced, the
container can retrieve its own private and customized kernel data (as the case of ❶ in Figure 3.1).
Using this cross-validation tool, we can quickly identify the pseudo files (and their internal kernel
data structures) that may expose system-wide host information to the container.
3.2.2 Leakage Channel Analysis
1The most recent check on the leakage channels was made on November 28, 2016.
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We list all pseudo files that may leak host information in Table 3.1. Those leakage channels con-
tain different aspects of host information. Container users can retrieve kernel data structures (e.g.,
/proc/modules shows the list of loaded modules), kernel events (e.g., /proc/interrupts shows the
number of interrupts per IRQ), and hardware information (e.g., /proc/cpuinfo and /proc/meminfo
show the specification of CPU and memory, respectively). In addition, container users are able
to retrieve performance statistics data through some channels. For example, containers can ob-
tain hardware sensor data (if these sensors are available in the physical machine), such as power
consumption for each package, cores, and DRAM through the RAPL sysfs interface, and the tem-
perature for each core through the Digital Temperature Sensor (DTS) sysfs interface. Moreover,
the usage of processors, memory, and disk I/O is also exposed to containers. While leaking such
information seems harmless at first glance, it could be exploited by malicious adversaries to launch
attacks. More detailed discussion is given in Section 3.3.
We further investigate the root causes of these information leakages by inspecting the kernel
code (in the Linux kernel version 4.7). Generally, the leakage problems are caused by the incom-
plete implementation of namespaces in the kernel. To be more specific, we summarize the two
main causes as follows: (1) Context checks are missing for existing namespaces, and (2) some
Linux subsystems are not (fully) namespaced. We give two case studies on net_prio.ifpriomap and
RAPL in containers to reveal the origins of leakages.
3.2.2.1 Case study I — net_prio.ifpriomap
The pseudo file net_prio.ifpriomap (under /sys/fs/cgroup/net_prio) contains a map of the priorities
assigned to traffic starting from processes in a cgroup and leaving the system on various interfaces.
The data format is in the form of [ifname priority]. We find that the kernel handler function hooked at
net_prio.ifpriomap is not aware of the NET namespace, and thus it discloses all network interfaces
on the physical machine to the containerized applications. To be more specific, the read operation
of net_prio.ifpriomap is handled by the function `2/nT`BQKT. Tracing from this function, we find
that it invokes 7Q`n2+?nM2i/2pn`+m and sets the first parameter as the address of BMBinM2i. It
iterates all network devices of the host, regardless of the NET namespace. Thus, from the view of
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a container, it can read the names of all network devices of the host.
3.2.2.2 Case study II — RAPL in containers
RAPL was recently introduced by Intel for setting power limits for processor packages and DRAM
of a single server, which can respond at the millisecond level [55]. In the container cloud, the sysfs
interface of RAPL, which locates under /sys/class/powercap/intel-rapl, is accessible to containers.
Therefore, it is possible for container tenants to obtain the system-wide power status of the host,
including the core, DRAM, and package, through this sysfs interface. For example, container users
can read the current energy counter in micro joules from the pseudo file energy_uj. The function
handler of energy_uj in the Intel RAPL Linux driver is ;2in2M2`;vn+QmMi2`. This function retrieves
the raw energy data from the RAPL MSR. As namespace has not been implemented for the power
data, the 2M2`;vn`r pointer refers to the host’s energy consumption data.
We further investigate the information leakage problems on container cloud services that adopt
the Docker /LXC container engine. We choose five commercial public multi-tenancy container
cloud services for leakage checking and present the results in Table 3.1. We anonymize the names
(CCi stands for ith Container Cloud) of these container cloud services before the cloud providers
patch the channels. The " indicates that the channel exists in the cloud, while the ! indicates
the opposite. We find that most of the leakage channels on local machines are also available in
the container cloud services. Some of them are unavailable due to the lack of support for specific
hardware (e.g., Intel processor before Sandy Bridge or AMD processors that do not support RAPL).
For cloud CC5, we find that the information of some channels is different from our local testbed,
which means that the cloud vendor has customized some additional restrictions. For example, only
the information about the cores and memory belonging to a tenant is available. However, those
channels partially leak the host information and could still be exploited by advanced attackers. We
mark them as #!.
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3.2.3 Inference of Co-resident Container
We further look in depth into specific cases to see whether they could be exploited to detect co-
resident containers.
3.2.3.1 Co-residence problems in cloud settings
Co-residence is a well-known research problem in cloud security. In order to extract a victim’s
information, adversaries tend tomovemalicious instances to the same physical host with the victim.
Zhang et al. have shown that it is possible for an attacker to hijack user accounts [131] and extract
private keys [130] with co-resident instances. In addition, the cost of achieving co-residence is
rather low [112]. Co-residence still remains a problem in existing clouds, due to the intention of
consolidating server resources and reducing cost. Traditional methods to verify co-residence are
based on cache [127] or memory-based leakage channels [118]. The accuracy of those methods
may downgrade due to the high noise in cloud settings.
3.2.3.2 Approaches and results of checking co-resident containers
Since containers can read the host information through the leakage channels we discovered, we
tend to measure whether some channels can be used for checking container co-residence. We
define three metrics, namely uniqueness (U), variation (V), and manipulation (M) to quantitatively
assess each channel’s capability of inferring co-residence.
The metric U indicates whether this channel bestows characteristic data that can uniquely iden-
tify a host machine. It is the most important and accurate factor for determining whether two con-
tainers locate on the same host. We have found 17 leakage channels (ranked top 17 in Table 3.2)
that satisfy this metric. Generally we can classify these channels into three groups:
1) Channels containing unique static identifiers. For example, boot_id under /proc/sys/kernel/random
is a random string generated at boot time and is unique for each running kernel. If two containers
can read the same boot_id, this is a clear sign that they are running on the same host kernel. The
data for channels in this group are both static and unique.
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2) Channels into which container tenants can dynamically implant unique signatures. For ex-
ample, from /proc/sched_debug, container users can retrieve all active process information of the
host through this interface. A tenant can launch a process with a uniquely crafted task name inside
the container. From the other containers, they can verify co-residence by searching this task name
in their own sched_debug. Similar situations apply to timer_list and locks.
3) Channels containing unique dynamic identifiers. For example, /proc/uptime has two data
fields: system up time and system idle time in seconds since booting. They are accumulated
values and are unique for every host machine. Similarly, energy_uj in the RAPL sysfs interface is
the accumulated energy counter in micro joules. The data read from channels in this group change
at real time, but are still unique to represent a host. We rank the channels in this group based on
their growth rates. A faster growth rate indicates a lower chance of duplication.
The metric V demonstrates whether the data change with time. With this feature available,
two containers can make snapshots of this pseudo file periodically at the same time. Then they
can determine co-residence by checking whether two data snapshot traces match with each other.
For example, starting from the same time, we can record MemFree in /proc/meminfo from two
containers every second for one minute. If these two 60-point data traces match with each other,
we are confident that these two containers run on the same host. Each channel contains a different
capacity of information for inferring co-residence, which can be naturally measured via the joint
Shannon entropy. We define the entropy H in Formula (3.1). Each channel C contains multiple
independent data fields Xi, and n represents the number of independent data fields. Each Xi
has possible values {xi1, · · · , xim}. We rank the capability of revealing co-residence for the nine
channels (for which U=False and V=True) based on their entropy results in Table 3.2.
H[C(X1, · · · , Xn)] =
n∑
i=1
[−
m∑
j=1
p(xij) log p(xij)]. (3.1)
The metric M indicates whether the container tenants can manipulate the data. We mark a
channel " if tenants can directly implant specially-crafted data into it. For example, we can create
a timer in a program with a special task name inside a container. This task name and its associated
timer will appear in /proc/timer_list. Another container can search for this special task name in the
timer_list to verify co-residence. We mark a channel #! if tenants can only indirectly influence the
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Table 3.2: Leakage Channels for Co-Residence Verification.
Leakage Channels U V M Rank
fT`Q+fbvbfF2`M2Hf`M/QKf#QQinB/ ! " "
fbvbf7bf+;`QmTfM2inT`BQfM2inT`BQXB7T`BQKT ! " "
fT`Q+fb+?2/n/2#m; ! ! !
fT`Q+fiBK2`nHBbi ! ! !
fT`Q+fHQ+Fb ! ! !
fT`Q+fmTiBK2 ! ! #"
fT`Q+fbii ! ! #"
fT`Q+fb+?2/bii ! ! #"
fT`Q+fbQ7iB`[b ! ! #"
fT`Q+fBMi2``mTib ! ! #"
fbvbf/2pB+2bfbvbi2KfMQ/2fMQ/2OfMmKbii ! ! #"
fbvbf+HbbfTQr2`+TfXXXf2M2`;vnmD2 ! ! #"
fbvbf/2pB+2bfbvbi2KfXXXfmb;23 ! ! #"
fbvbf/2pB+2bfbvbi2KfXXXfiBK24 ! ! #"
fT`Q+fbvbf7bf/2Mi`v@bii2 ! ! #"
fT`Q+fbvbf7bfBMQ/2@M` ! ! #"
fT`Q+fbvbf7bf7BH2@M` ! ! #"
fT`Q+fxQM2BM7Q " ! #"
fT`Q+fK2KBM7Q " ! #"
fT`Q+f7bf2ti9fb/OfK#n;`QmTb " ! #"
fbvbf/2pB+2bfbvbi2KfMQ/2fMQ/2OfpKbii " ! #"
fbvbf/2pB+2bfbvbi2KfMQ/2fMQ/2OfK2KBM7Q " ! #"
fbvbf/2pB+2bfTHi7Q`KfXXXfi2KTOnBMTmi5 " ! #"
fT`Q+fHQ/p; " ! #"
fT`Q+fbvbfF2`M2Hf`M/QKf2Mi`QTvnpBH " ! #"
fT`Q+fbvbfF2`M2HfXXXfKtnM2rB/H2nH#n+Qbi6 " ! "
fT`Q+fKQ/mH2b " " "
fT`Q+f+TmBM7Q " " "
fT`Q+fp2`bBQM " " "
Low High
data in this channel. For example, an attacker can use taskset command to bond a computing-
intensive workload to a specific core, and check the CPU utilization, power consumption, or tem-
perature from another container. Those entries could be exploited by advanced attackers as covert
channels to transmit signals.
For those channels that do not have these U V M properties, we consider them hard to be ex-
2/sys/class/powercap/intel-rapl:#/intel-rapl:#/energy_uj
3/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu#/cpuidle/state#/usage
4/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu#/cpuidle/state#/time
5/sys/devices/platform/coretemp.#/hwmon/hwmon#/temp#_input
6/proc/sys/kernel/sched_domain/cpu#/domain#/max_newidle_lb_cost
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Figure 3.2: The Power Consumption for 8 Servers in One Week.
ploited. For example, most servers in a cloud data center probably install the same OS distribution
with the same module list. Although /proc/modules leaks the information of loaded modules on the
host, it is difficult to use this channel to infer co-resident containers.
3.3 Synergistic Power Attack
At first glance, the leaked information discovered in Section 3.2 seems difficult to exploit. Because
both procfs and sysfs are mounted read-only inside the containers, malicious tenants can only
read such information, but modification is not allowed. We argue that attackers can make better
decisions by learning the runtime status of the host machine.
In this section, we present a potential synergistic power attack in the scope of power outage
threats that may impact the reliability of data centers. We demonstrate that adversaries can exploit
these information leakages discovered by us to amplify the attack effects, reduce the attack costs,
and facilitate attack orchestration. All experiments are conducted in a real-world container cloud.
3.3.1 Attack Amplification
The key to launching a successful power attack is to generate a short-time high power spike that
can surpass the power facility’s supply capacity. As we mentioned in 3.1.3, the root cause of power
attacks is the wide adoption of power oversubscription, which makes it possible for power spikes
to surpass the safe threshold. In addition, a rack-level power capping mechanism can only react
in minute-level time granularity, leaving space for the occurrence of a short-time high power spike.
56
In the most critical situation, the overcharging of power may trip the branch circuit breaker, cause a
power outage, and finally bring down the servers. The heights of power spikes are predominantly
determined by the resources that are controlled by attackers. Existing power attacks maximize the
power consumption by customizing power-intensive workloads, denoted as power viruses. For
example, Ganesan et al. [46, 47] leveraged genetic algorithms to automatically generate power
viruses that consume more power than normal stress benchmarks. However, launching a power
attack from scratch or being agnostic about the surrounding environment wastes unnecessary
attacking resources.
In a real-world data center, the average utilization is around 20% to 30%, as reported by Barroso
et al. [25]. With such low utilization, the chance of tripping the circuit breaker by indiscriminately
launching power attacks is extremely low. However, although the average utilization is low, data
centers still encounter power outage threats under peak demands [116]. This indicates that the
power consumption of physical servers fluctuates enormously with the changing workloads. To
confirm this assumption, we conduct an experiment to monitor the whole-system power consump-
tion (via the RAPL leakage channel in case study II of Section 3.2) of eight physical servers in a
container cloud for one week. We present the result in Figure 3.2. We first average the power
data with a 30-second interval and observe drastic power changes on both Day 2 and Day 5. Fur-
thermore, we pick a high power consumption region in Day 2 and average the data at the interval
of one second (which is a typical time window for generating a power spike). The peak power
consumption could reach 1,199 Watts (W). In total, there was a 34.72% (899W ∼ 1,199W) power
difference in this one-week range. We anticipate that the power consumption difference would be
even larger if we could monitor it for a longer time period, such as on a holiday like Black Friday,
when online shopping websites hosted on a cloud may incur a huge power surge.
For a synergistic power attack in a container cloud, instead of indiscriminately starting a power-
intensive workload, the adversaries can monitor the whole-system power consumption through the
RAPL channel [126] and learn the crests and troughs of the power consumption pattern at real time.
Therefore, they can leverage the background power consumption (generated by benign workloads
from other tenants on the same host) and superimpose their power attacks when the servers are
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Figure 3.3: The Power Consumption of 8 Servers under Attack.
at their peak running time. This is similar to the phenomenon of insider trading in the financial
market—the one with more insider information can always trade at the right time. The adversaries
can boost their power spikes, by adding on already-high power consumption, to a higher level with
the “insider” power consumption information leaked through the RAPL channel.
3.3.2 Reduction of Attack Costs
From the attackers’ perspective, they always intend to maximize attack outcomes with the lowest
costs. Running power-intensive workloads continuously could definitely catch all the crests of
benign power consumption. However, it may not be practical for real-world attacks for several
reasons. First, it is not stealthy. To launch a power attack, the attacker needs to run power-intensive
workloads. Such behavior has obvious patterns and could be easily detected by cloud providers.
Second, utilization-based billing models are now becoming more popular. More cloud services
provide finer-grained prices based on CPU/memory utilization and the volume of network traffic.
For instance, Elastic Container provides containers with CPUmetering-based billing for customers
[8]. IBM Cloud provides billing metrics for computing resources in the cloud [13]. Amazon EC2 [3]
offers Burstable Performance Instances that could occasionally burst but do not fully run most of
the time. The VMware OnDemand Pricing Calculator [14] even gives an estimate for different
utilization levels. For example, it charges $2.87 per month for an instance with 16 VCPUs with an
average of 1% utilization, and $167.25 for the same server with full utilization. Under these cloud
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billing models, continuous power attacks may finally lead to an expensive bill.
For synergistic power attacks, monitoring power consumption through RAPL has almost zero
CPU utilization. To achieve the same effects (the height of power spikes), synergistic power at-
tacks can significantly reduce the attack costs compared to continuous and periodic attacks. In
Figure 3.3, we compare the attack effects of a synergistic power attack with a periodic attack
(launching power attacks every 300 seconds). Synergistic power attacks can achieve a 1,359W
power spike with only two trials in 3,000 seconds, whereas periodic attacks were launched nine
times and could only reach 1,280W at most.
3.3.3 Attack Orchestration
Different from traditional power attacks, another unique characteristic of synergistic power attack is
its attack orchestration. Assume an attacker is already controlling a number of container instances.
If these containers scatter in different locations within a data center, their power additions on mul-
tiple physical servers put no pressure on power facilities. Existing power-capping mechanisms
can tolerate multiple small power surges from different locations with no difficulty. The only way to
launch a practical power attack is to aggregate all “ammunition” into adjacent locations and attack
a single power supply simultaneously. Here we discuss in depth on the orchestration of attacking
container instances.
As we mentioned in Section 3.2, by exploiting multiple leakage channels7, attackers can aggre-
gate multiple container instances into one physical server. Specifically in our experiment on CC1,
we choose to use timer_list to verify the co-residence of multiple containers. The detailed verifica-
tion method is explained in Section 3.2.3. We repeatedly create container instances and terminate
instances that are not on the same physical server. By doing this, we succeed in deploying three
containers on the same server with trivial effort. We run four copies of Prime [17] benchmark within
each container to fully utilize the four allocated cores. The results are illustrated in Figure 3.4. As
we can see, each container can contribute approximately 40W power. With three containers, an
attacker can easily raise the power consumption to almost 230W, which is about 100W more than
the average power consumption for a single server.
7Typically, if a channel is a strong co-residence indicator, leveraging this one channel only should be enough.
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Figure 3.4: The Power Consumption of a Server under Attack.
We also find /proc/uptime to be another interesting leakage channel. The uptime includes two
data entries, the booting time of the physical server and the idle time of all cores. In our experiment,
we find that some servers have similar booting times but different idle times. Typically servers in
data centers do not reboot once being installed and turned on. A different idle time indicates that
they are not the same physical server, while a similar booting time demonstrates that they have a
high probability of being installed and turned on at the same time period. This is strong evidence
that they might also be in close proximity and share the same circuit breaker. Attackers can exploit
this channel to aggregate their attack container instances into adjacent physical servers. This
greatly increases their chances of tripping circuit breakers to cause power outages.
3.4 Defense Approach
3.4.1 A Two-Stage Defense Mechanism
Intuitively, the solution should eliminate all the leakages so that no leaked information could be
retrieved through those channels. We divide the defense mechanism into two stages to close the
loopholes: (1) masking the channels and (2) enhancing the container’s resource isolation model.
In the first stage, the system administrators can explicitly deny the read access to the channels
within the container, e.g., through security policies in AppArmor or mounting the pseudo file “un-
readable”. This does not require any change to the kernel code (merging into the upstream Linux
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Figure 3.5: The Workflow of Power-Based Namespace.
kernel might take some time) and can immediately eliminate information leakages. This solution
depends on whether legitimate applications running inside the container use these channels. If
such information is orthogonal to the containerized applications, masking it will not have a neg-
ative impact on the container tenants. We have reported our results to Docker and all the cloud
vendors listed in Table 3.1, and we have received active responses. We are working together
with container cloud vendors to fix this information leakage problem and minimize the impact upon
applications hosted in containers. This masking approach is a quick fix, but it may add restric-
tions for the functionality of containerized applications, which contradicts the container’s concept
of providing a generalized computation platform.
In the second stage, the defense approach involves fixing missing namespace context checks
and virtualizing more system resources (i.e., the implementation of new namespaces) to enhance
the container’s isolation model. We first reported information disclosure bugs related to existing
namespaces to Linux kernel maintainers, and they quickly released a new patch for one of the
problems ([CVE-2017-5967]). For the other channels with no namespace isolation protection, we
need to change the kernel code to enforce a finer-grained partition of system resources. Such
an approach could involve non-trivial efforts since each channel needs to be fixed separately.
Virtualizing a specific kernel component might affect multiple kernel subsystems. In addition, some
system resources are not easy to be precisely partitioned to each container. However, we consider
this to be a fundamental solution to the problem. In particular, to defend against synergistic power
attacks, we design and implement a proof-of-concept power-based namespace in the Linux kernel
to present the partitioned power usage to each container.
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3.4.2 Power-based Namespace
We propose a power-based namespace to present per-container power usage through the un-
changed RAPL interface to each container. Without leaking the system-wide power consumption
information, attackers cannot infer the power state of the host, thus eliminating their chance of
superimposing power-intensive workloads on benign power peaks. Moreover, with per-container
power usage statistics at hand, we can dynamically throttle the computing power (or increase the
usage fee) of containers that exceed their predefined power thresholds. It is possible for container
cloud administrators to design a finer-grained billing model based on this power-based namespace.
There are three goals for our design. (1) Accuracy: as there is no hardware support for per-
container power partitioning, our software-based power modeling needs to reflect the accurate
power usage for each container. (2) Transparency: applications inside a container should be
unaware of the power variations outside this namespace, and the interface of power subsystem
should remain unchanged. (3) Efficiency: power partitioning should not incur non-trivial perfor-
mance overhead in or out of containers.
We illustrate the workflow of our system in Figure 3.5. Our power-based namespace consists of
three major components: data collection, power modeling, and on-the-fly calibration. We maintain
the same Intel RAPL interface within containers, but change the implementation of handling read
operations on energy usages. Once a read operation of energy usage is detected, the modified
RAPL driver retrieves the per-container performance data (data collection), uses the retrieved data
to model the energy usage (power modeling), and finally calibrates the modeled energy usage (on-
the-fly calibration). We discuss each component in detail below.
3.4.2.1 Data collection
In order to model per-container power consumption, we need to obtain the fine-grained perfor-
mance data for each container. Each container is associated with a cpuacct cgroup. A cpuacct
cgroup accounts for the CPU cycles on a processor core for a container. The CPU cycles are
accumulated. We only use CPU cycles to compute the rate of the cache miss rate and branch
miss rate later. The Linux kernel also has a perf_event subsystem, which supports accounting for
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different types of performance events. The granularity of performance accounting could be a single
process or a group of processes (considered as a perf_event cgroup). By now, we only retrieve the
data for retired instructions, cache misses, and branch misses (which are needed in the following
power modeling component) for each perf_event cgroup. Our current implementation is extensible
to collect more performance event types corresponding to the changes of power modeling in the
future.
We monitor the performance events from the initialization of a power-based namespace and
create multiple perf_events, each associated with a specific performance event type and a specific
CPU core. Then we connect the perf_cgroup of this container with these perf_events to start ac-
counting. In addition, we need to set the owner of all created perf_events as TASK_TOMBSTONE,
indicating that such performance accounting is decoupled from any user process.
3.4.2.2 Power modeling
To implement a power-based namespace, we need to attribute the power consumption to each
container. Instead of providing transient power consumption, RAPL offers accumulated energy
usages for package, core, and DRAM, respectively. The power consumption can be calculated
by measuring the energy consumption over a time unit window. Our power-based namespace
also provides accumulative per-container energy data, in the same format as in the original RAPL
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interface.
We first attribute the power consumption for the core. Traditional power modeling leverages
CPU utilization [83] to attribute the power consumption for cores. However, Xu et al. [123] demon-
strated that the power consumption could vary significantly with the same CPU utilization. The
underlying pipeline and data dependence could lead to CPU stalls and idling of function units.
The actual numbers of retired instructions [72, 102] under the same CPU utilization are different.
Figure 3.6 reveals the relation between retired instructions and energy. We test on four different
benchmarks: the idle loop written in C, prime, 462.libquantum in SPECCPU2006, and stress with
different memory configurations. We run the benchmarks on a host and use Perf [16] to collect per-
formance statistics data. We can see that for each benchmark, the energy consumption is almost
strictly linear to the number of retired instructions. However, the gradients of fitted lines change
correspondingly with application types. To make our model more accurate, we further include the
cache miss rate [72] and branch miss rate to build a multi-degree polynomial model to fit the slope.
For the DRAM, we use the number of cache misses to profile the energy. Figure 3.7 presents
the energy consumption for the same benchmarks with the same configurations in the core exper-
iment. It clearly indicates that the number of cache misses is approximately linear to the DRAM
energy. Based on this, we use the linear regression of cache misses to model the DRAM energy.
For the power consumption of package, we sum the values of core, DRAM, and an extra con-
stant. The specific models are illustrated in Formula (3.2), whereM represents themodeled energy;
CM, BM, C indicate the number of cache misses, branch misses, and CPU cycles, respectively;
and F is the function derived through multiple linear regressions to fit the slope. I is the num-
ber of retired instructions. α, β, γ, and λ are the constants derived from the experiment data in
Figures 3.6 and 3.7.
Mcore = F(
CM
C ,
BM
C ) · I+α,
Mdram = β · CM+ γ,
Mpackage = Mcore +Mdram + λ.
(3.2)
Here we discuss the influence of floating point instructions for power modeling. While an indi-
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vidual floating point instruction might consume more energy than an integer operation, workloads
with high ratios of floating point instructions might actually result in lower power consumption over-
all, since the functional units might be forced to be idle in different stages of the pipeline. It is
necessary to take the micro-architecture into consideration to build a more refined model. We plan
to pursue this direction in our future work. Furthermore, the choices of parameters α,β, γ are also
affected by the architecture. Such a problem could be mitigated in the following calibration step.
3.4.2.3 On-the-fly calibration
Our system also models the energy data for the host and cross-validates it with the actual energy
data acquired through RAPL. To minimize the error of modeling data, we use the following For-
mula (3.3) to calibrate the modeled energy data for each container. The Econtainer represents the
energy value returned to each container. This on-the-fly calibration is conducted for each read
operation to the RAPL interface and can effectively reduce the number of errors in the previous
step.
Econtainer =
Mcontainer
Mhost
· ERAPL. (3.3)
3.5 Defense Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our power-based namespace on a local machine in three aspects:
accuracy, security, and performance. Our testbed is equipped with Intel i7-6700 3.40GHz CPU
with 8 cores, 16GB of RAM, and running Ubuntu Linux 16.04 with kernel version 4.7.0.
3.5.1 Accuracy
We use the SPECCPU2006 benchmark to measure the accuracy of the power modeling. We
compare the modeled power usage with the ground truth obtained through RAPL. The power con-
sumption is equal to the energy consumption per second. Due to the restriction of the security
policy of the Docker container, we select a subset of SPECCPU2006 benchmarks that are feasi-
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Figure 3.8: The Accuracy of Our Energy Modeling Approach to Estimate the Active Power for the
Container from Aggregate Event Usage and RAPL.
ble to run inside the container and have no overlap with the benchmarks used for power modeling.
The error ξ is defined as follows:
ξ =
|(ERAPL −￿diff)−Mcontainer|
ERAPL −￿diff , (3.4)
where ERAPL is the power usage read from RAPL on the host, and Mcontainer is the modeled power
usage for the same workload read within the container. Note that both the host and container
consume power at an idle state with trivial differences. We use a constant ￿diff as the modifier
reflecting the difference in power consumption at an idle state for a host and a container. The
results, illustrated in Figure 3.8, show that our power modeling is accurate as the error values of
all the tested benchmarks are lower than 0.05.
3.5.2 Security
We also evaluate our system from the security perspective. With the power-based namespace en-
abled, the container should only retrieve the power consumed within the container and be unaware
of the host’s power status. We launch two containers in our testbed for comparison. We run the
SPECCPU2006 benchmark in one container and leave the other one idle. We record the power
usage per second of both containers and the host. We show the results of 401.bzip2 in Figure 3.9.
All other benchmarks exhibit similar patterns.
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Figure 3.9: Transparency: A Malicious Container (Container 2) is Unaware of the Power Condition
for the Host.
When both containers have no workload, their power consumption is at the same level as that
of the host, e.g., from 0s to 10s. Once container 1 starts a workload at 10s, we can find that the
power consumption of container 1 and the host surges simultaneously. From 10s to 60s, container
1 and the host have a similar power usage pattern, whereas container 2 is still at a low power
consumption level. Container 2 is unaware of the power fluctuation on the whole system because
of the isolation enforced by the power-based namespace. This indicates that our system is effective
for isolating and partitioning power consumption for multiple containers, and thus it can neutralize
the synergistic power attacks.
3.5.3 Performance
We use UnixBench to compare the performance overhead before and after enabling our system.
Table 3.3 lists all results.
As the results show, CPU benchmarks such as Dhrystone (testing integer and string opera-
tions) andWhetstone (testing float point arithmetic performance) incur negligible overhead. Other
benchmarks like shell scripts, pipe throughput, and system call also trigger little overhead. The
pipe-based context switching does incur a 61.53% overhead in the case of one parallel copy, but
it decreases to 1.63% for 8 parallel copies. We anticipate that inter-cgroup context switching in-
volves enabling/disabling the performance event monitor, whereas intra-cgroup context switching
does not involve any such overhead. This could explain why 8 parallel copies canmaintain a similar
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Table 3.3: Performance Results of Unix Benchmarks
1 Parallel Copy 8 Parallel Copies
Benchmarks Original Modified Overhead Original Modified Overhead
Dhrystone 2 using register variables 3,788.9 3,759.2 0.78% 19,132.9 19,149.2 0.08%
Double-Precision Whetstone 926.8 918.0 0.94% 6,630.7 6,620.6 0.15%
Execl Throughput 290.9 271.9 6.53% 7,975.2 7,298.1 8.49%
File Copy 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks 3,495.1 3,469.3 0.73% 3,104.9 2,659.7 14.33%
File Copy 256 bufsize 500 maxblocks 2,208.5 2,175.1 0.04% 1,982.9 1,622.2 18.19%
File Copy 4096 bufsize 8000 maxblocks 5,695.1 5,829.9 -2.34% 6,641.3 5,822.7 12.32%
Pipe Throughput 1,899.4 1,878.4 1.1% 9,507.2 9,491.1 0.16%
Pipe-based Context Switching 653.0 251.2 61.53% 5,266.7 5,180.7 1.63%
Process Creation 1416.5 1289.7 8.95% 6618.5 6063.8 8.38%
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent) 3,660.4 3,548.0 3.07% 16,909.7 16,404.2 2.98%
Shell Scripts (8 concurrent) 11,621.0 11,249.1 3.2% 15,721.1 15,589.2 0.83%
System Call Overhead 1,226.6 1,212.2 1.17% 5,689.4 5,648.1 0.72%
System Benchmarks Index Score 2,000.8 1,807.4 9.66% 7,239.8 6,813.5 7.03%
performance level with the power-based namespace disabled. In addition, context switching only
contributes to a very small portion of the whole-system performance overhead, so there is trivial
impact for the normal use. As demonstrated in the last row of Table 3.3, the overall performance
overheads for the UnixBench are 9.66% for one parallel copy and 7.03% for 8 parallel copies,
respectively. Our system’s performance depends heavily on the implementation of perf_event
cgroup and could improve with the advancement of a performance monitoring subsystem.
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Synergistic Power Attacks without the RAPL Channel
We also notice that servers in some container clouds are not equipped with RAPL or other similar
embedded power meters. Those servers might still face power attacks. Without power-capping
tools like RAPL, those servers might be vulnerable to host-level power attacks on a single ma-
chine. In addition, if power data is not directly available, advanced attackers will try to approximate
the power status based on the resource utilization information, such as the CPU and memory uti-
lization, which is still available in the identified information leakages. It would be better to make
system-wide performance statistics unavailable to container tenants.
3.6.2 Complete Container Implementation
The root cause for information leakage and synergistic power attack is the incomplete implemen-
tation of the isolation mechanisms in the Linux kernel. It would be better to introduce more security
68
features, such as implementing more namespaces and control groups. However, some system
resources are still difficult to be partitioned, e.g., interrupts, scheduling information, and tempera-
ture. People also argue that the complete container implementation is no different from a virtual
machine, and loses all the container’s advantages. It is a trade-off for containers to deal with. The
question of how to balance security, performance, and usability in container clouds needs further
investigation.
3.7 Related Work
In this section, we list some research efforts that inspire our work and highlight the differences
between our work and previous research. We mainly discuss research works in the following three
areas:
3.7.1 Performance and Security Research on Containers
Since containers have recently become popular, researchers are curious about the performance
comparison between containers and hardware virtualization. Felter et al. compared the perfor-
mance of Docker and KVM by using a set of benchmarks covering CPU, memory, storage, and
networking resources [43]. Their results show that Docker can achieve equal or better perfor-
mance than KVM in all cases. Spoiala et al. [106] used the Kurento Media Server to compare the
performance of WebRTC servers on both Docker and KVM. They also demonstrated that Docker
outperforms KVM and could support real-time applications. Morabito et al. [85] compared the
performance between traditional hypervisor and OS-level virtualization with respect to computing,
storage, memory, and networks. They conducted experiments on Docker, LXC, and KVM and
observed that Disk I/O is still the bottleneck of the KVM hypervisor. All of these works demon-
strate that container-based OS-level virtualization can achieve a higher performance than hard-
ware virtualization. Besides performance, the security of a container cloud is always an important
research area. Gupta [56] gave a brief overview of Docker security. Bui [29] also performed an
analysis on Docker containers, including the isolation problem and corresponding kernel security
mechanisms. They claimed that Docker containers are fairly secure with default configurations.
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Grattafiori et al. [53] summarized a variety of potential vulnerabilities of containers. They also men-
tioned several channels in the memory-based pseudo file systems. Previous research efforts on
the performance and security of containers encourage us to investigate more on how containers
can achieve the same security guarantees as hardware virtualization, but with trivial performance
trade-offs. We are among the first to systematically identify the information leakage problem in
containers and investigate potential container-based power attack threats built upon these leak-
age channels.
3.7.2 Cloud Security and Side/Covert Channel Attacks
Cloud security has received much attention from both academia and industry. Co-residence de-
tection in the cloud settings is the most closely related research topic to our work. Co-residence
detection was first proposed by Ristenpart et al. [98]. They demonstrated that an attacker can place
a malicious VM co-resident with a target VM on the same sever and then launch side-channel and
covert-channel attacks. Two previous works [112, 122] show that it is still practical to achieve co-
residence in existing mainstream cloud services. To verify co-residence on the same physical
server, attackers typically leverage side channels or covert channels [124, 125], e.g., one widely
adopted approach is to use cache-based covert channels [65, 111, 121]. Multiple instances lo-
cating on the same package share the last-level caches. By using some dedicated operations,
such as cflush [127], attackers can detect co-residence by measuring the time of cache access-
ing. Liu et al. [76] demonstrated that l3 cache side-channel attacks are practical for cross-core
and cross-VM attacks. Zhang et al. conducted real side-channel attacks on the cloud [130, 131]
and proposed several defense mechanisms to mitigate those attacks [120,129,132]. In particular,
they demonstrated that cross-tenant side-channel attacks can be successfully conducted in PaaS
with co-resident servers [131]. Besides the cache-based channel, memory bus [118] and memory
deduplication [119] have also proved to be effective for covert-channel construction. Different from
existing research efforts on side/covert channels, we discover a system-wide information leakage
in the container cloud settings and design a new methodology to quantitatively assess the ca-
pacity of leakage channels for co-residence detection. In addition, compared to the research on
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minimizing the kernel attack surface for VMs [54], we proposed a two-stage defense mechanism
to minimize the space for information leakages and power attacks on container clouds.
System status information, such as core temperature and system power consumption, have
also been used to build side/covert channels. Thiele et al. [26, 82] proposed a thermal covert
channel based on the temperature of each core and tested the capacity in a local testbed. Power
consumption could also be abused to break AES [67]. In our work, we do not use the power
consumption data as a covert channel to transfer information. Instead, we demonstrate that ad-
versaries may leverage the host power consumption leakage to launch more advanced power
attacks.
3.7.3 Power Modeling
When hardware-based power meter is absent, power modeling is the approach to approximating
power consumption. Russell et al. [99] and Chakrabarti et al. [31] proposed instruction-level power
modeling. Their works indicate that the number of branches affects power consumption. There
are several works of approximating power consumption for VMs. Both works [63,72] demonstrate
that VM-level power consumption can be estimated by CPU utilization and last-level cache miss.
Mobius et al. [83] broke the power consumption of VM into CPU, cache, memory, and disk. BIT-
WATTS [35] modeled the power consumption at a finer-grained process level. Shen et al. [102]
proposed a power container to account for energy consumption of requests in multi-core systems.
Our defense against the synergistic power attack is mainly inspired by the power modeling ap-
proach for VMs. We propose a new power partitioning technique to approximate the per-container
power consumption and reuse the RAPL interface, thus addressing the RAPL data leakage prob-
lem in the container settings.
3.8 Chapter Summary
Container cloud services have become popular for providing lightweight OS-level virtual hosting
environments. The emergence of container technology profoundly changes the eco-system of
developing and deploying distributed applications in the cloud. However, due to the incomplete
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implementation of system resource partitioning mechanisms in the Linux kernel, there still exist
some security concerns for multiple container tenants sharing the same kernel. In this chapter, we
first present a systematic approach to discovering information leakage channels that may expose
host information to containers. By exploiting such leaked host information, malicious container
tenants can launch a new type of power attack that may potentially jeopardize the dependability of
power systems in the data centers. Additionally, we discuss the root causes of these information
leakages and propose a two-stage defense mechanism. Our evaluation demonstrates that the
proposed solution is effective and incurs trivial performance overhead.
72
Chapter 4
Sudden Death of Live Migration and Its
Security Implications
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a new vulnerability in the existing VM live migration caused by the
insecure TCP channel established for the transfer of memory pages. We demonstrate that a vanilla
TCP-RST attack could lead to devastating and unrecoverable consequences for today’s VM live
migrations, especially post-copy-based approaches. By inducing a reset of the TCP connection of
a post-copy live migration, adversaries can force a VM to enter into an inconsistent memory state,
causing failures and unpredictable behavior. The reason is that post-copy immediately stops the
VM on the source and starts running the VM on the destination server without any checks as
to the integrity of the transfer process. The consequence of terminating the TCP connection is
that the VM on the destination server becomes unresponsive or in many cases crashes. This is
due to missing parts of the memory did not transfer properly from the source. Meanwhile, the
newly modified memory pages on the destination server are also unavailable to the stopped VM
on the source, resulting in memory inconsistencies. We emphasize that the root cause of such a
vulnerability is rooted in the fundamental design of post-copy rather than the actual implementation.
The lack of protection in existing hypervisors’ implementation further exacerbates this problem,
making the consequences severe and the remote VM image unrecoverable. Furthermore, the TCP
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reset attack could also significantly increase the service downtime and degrade the performance
of the running VM, for both pre-copy and post-copy live migration approaches.
We analyze in depth the possible approaches to launch the TCP reset attack on VM live migra-
tion. In particular, we propose a new method to discover the timing of a migration process as well
as the destination port number. Attackers can infer that useful information by intentionally initiating
fake migration requests. In some cases, attackers are even able to hinder the migration connection
from being established. While the process of VM live migration includes heavy networking traffic,
we further propose an enhanced algorithm that exploits the challenge ACK vulnerability [30] to
reset the migration connection. Experimental results show that our attack can break the migration
in a few minutes. In terms of defense strategies, we present two possible mechanisms to mitigate
the TCP reset vulnerability from becoming a serious threat for live migration in cloud environments.
We implement a prototype by modifying QEMU and the Linux kernel.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the background of VM
live migration and describes the reset threat to TCP connections. Section 4.3 presents the vulner-
ability in VM live migration process, and details the method to reset the migration connection within
heavy networking traffic. Section 4.4 shows the evaluation of our attack on VM live migration from
different aspects. Section 4.5 presents two general defense mechanisms. Section 4.6 surveys
related work, and finally Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 VM Live Migration
Clark et al. [34] first proposed VM live migration as a procedure of migrating an entire OS as well as
all of its applications as one unit from one host machine to another. All states and system resources
of the original VM, including memory, storage, and network connectivity, are transferred from the
source to the destination. While the key procedure for VM live migration is the transfer of the main
memory state, two major approaches, pre-copy [34] and post-copy [58,59], are widely deployed.
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4.2.1.1 Pre-copy
Typically, a pre-copy-based VM live migration involves four steps. First, the source server and
destination server enter into a ready-for-migration mode. In particular, the destination side should
be listening at a specified port. The TCP connection is then established on that port once the
migration command is issued. After that, the memory of the source VM will be copied in an iterative
fashion. It first transfers all the pages to the target server. During this iteration, some pages become
dirty. The migration process then continues to repeatedly copy those newly generated dirty pages.
Once the iterative copying is no longer beneficial, the source VM would be suspended, and the
rest of the inconsistent memory is copied. Finally, the VM on the destination side is activated, and
the source VM is paused. As we see, the VM must be taken down to finish the migration. The
amount of service downtime depends on the running workloads as well as the bandwidth of the
TCP connection. The downtime could be huge if there is a large changing rate for dirty pages.
4.2.1.2 Post-copy
Different from pre-copy, which starts with copying memory pages, post-copy first stops the source
VM. During this downtime, only minimum execution states needed by the VM to start (e.g., the
processor state) are copied. After this minimum copying, the VM is immediately resumed on the
target side. Then, post-copy copies the memory pages from the source to the destination. Several
techniques could be applied to fetch memory: (1) demand paging, which transfers the pages that
page faults are generated by the resumed VM; (2) active pushing, which actively pushes the VM’s
pages to the target; and (3) prepaging, which predicts the pages that might be accessed by the run-
ning VM and transfers the pages before they are faulted. Compared with the pre-copy approach,
post-copy can significantly reduce service downtime, and thus has recently been implemented in
various hypervisors, including Xen and KVM.
4.2.2 TCP Reset Attack
A TCP connection is defined by a four-tuple IbQm`+2 AS //`2bbc /2biBMiBQM AS //`2bbc
bQm`+2 TQ`i MmK#2`c /2biBMiBQM TQ`i MmK#2`=. Some features like sequence numbers and
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acknowledgment numbers are utilized to ensure a reliable connection. Normally, attackers need
to obtain all four tuples as well as a valid sequence number to interfere with the connection. While
the TCP protocol was not initially designed for security concerns, vulnerabilities exist for attackers
to infer the four tuples and sequence numbers. One type of those malicious attacks is the TCP
reset attack. By forging TCP packets with specific flags, attackers can terminate an existing TCP
connection.
4.2.2.1 Blind Reset Attack
RFC 5961 defines two types of blind reset attacks: using SYN bit or RST bit. Before RFC 5961, if
the sequence number of an incoming SYN or RST packet is in the valid receive window, the receiver
would reset this connection. The blind in-window reset attack was first described by Watson [114]:
with the knowledge of the four tuples, attackers can reset the connection if the sequence number of
the crafted packet is in the window. As a result, a brute-force attacker can simply send one packet
in each possible window. A TCP connection uses a 32-bit number recording the next expected
in-order sequence number, and another 32-bit number for the last accepted sequence number. A
16-bit number is used to report the receive window size, which has the largest value, 216. The total
number of packets required for the attack is 232/wsize, which could be conducted within several
seconds in a high-speed networking environment.
RFC 5961 suggests a tight handling of incoming reset packets. For an SYN packet, regardless
of the sequence number, the receiver sends back an ACK packet (known as a challenge ACK) to
request an RST packet with the correct sequence number from the sender to terminate the con-
nection. For an RST packet, the receiver would simply drop the packet if the sequence number is
outside of the valid receive window. For an in-window RST packet, an ACK packet with the correct
sequence number would be sent to confirm the loss of connection. With the implementation fol-
lowing RFC 5961, a blind attacker can only terminate the TCP connection with a matching packet.
The possibility of a blind attack is significantly reduced to 1/232.
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4.2.2.2 Side-channel TCP Attacks
Even when strictly following RFC 5961, previous works have shown that off-path attacks are still
possible by leveraging various information leaked from specific side-channels [40, 41, 50, 93, 94].
Besides, a more recent work [30] uncovers a new vulnerability ([CVE-2016-5696]) and allows blind
off-path reset and data injection attacks.
The vulnerability is raised because of the challenge ACK. To save system and bandwidth re-
sources for sending ACK packets, RFC 5961 introduces a challenge ACK throttling mechanism. A
global maximum number of challenge ACKs (shared by all TCP connections in the server) is set to
100 by default in a 1-second interval (on Linux). To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker can abuse
a regular TCP connection to measure the remaining challenge ACK counters, while simultaneously
sending probe packets. If the crafted packet triggers a challenge ACK, the number of remaining
challenge ACKs would be less than 100. The work [30] shows that attackers can infer the four
tuples as well as the sequence and ACK numbers in an idle or slow TCP connection.
Linux kernel maintainers soon released several patches to defend against the challenge ACK
vulnerability. For instance, the limit is raised from 100 to 1,000 by setting sysctl knobs. However,
huge amounts of servers are still left unpatched. Previous work [95] shows that less than 40% of
servers of Alexa Top 1 million websites are patched after six months of the releasing of the patch.
Also, such a vulnerability were exploited on TCP connections with light or even idle traffics. Heavy
connections, such as VM live migration, are believed to be safe under such exploitation.
4.3 Threats in VM Live Migration
While numerous research efforts have beenmade to improve the performance of VM live migration,
little attention has been paid to the security aspects. The reason is that live migration cannot be
initiated by normal users in the cloud environment. Hence, it is generally believed that the existing
approach is secure enough, and many protection mechanisms are not taken seriously. In this sec-
tion, we argue that the TCP-RST attack could lead to devastating and unrecoverable consequences
for today’s post-copy-based VM live migrations. The termination of a TCP connection would cause
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Figure 4.1: Post-copy VM Live Migration.
a VM to enter into an inconsistent memory state. Besides, while one remarkable advantage for
post-copy is the short service downtime, we show that the TCP reset attack could significantly
increase service downtime. Also, the performance of the running VM might be affected for both
pre-copy and post-copy live migration approaches. We first present the vulnerability overview for
post-copy and pre-copy VM live migration. We then detail the procedure to launch the TCP reset
attack on the VM live migration.
4.3.1 Vulnerability Overview
4.3.1.1 Post-copy
Post-copy stops the source VM immediately after the TCP connection is established, and runs the
VM on the target as soon as possible by transferring the minimum processor states. This strategy
greatly reduces the service downtime. The rest of the memory pages are actively transferred from
the source to the target. Figure 4.1 shows a snapshot of memory page statuses at one time. In
this procedure, the case ❶ represents memory pages that have been transferred from the source
to the target. Since the VM is running on the target server at the same time that memory pages
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are copying (as the case of ❸), pages that have been transferred might be modified (as the case
of ❷), and new dirty pages are generated (as the case of ❹).
If the RST attack succeeds in terminating the TCP connection at this point, in current hypervisor
implementation, the VM on the target server would be irresponsive immediately. In some cases,
the VM would crash. The reason is that part of the memory is still on the source (like the case
of ❸ in Figure 4.1). There is no way to resume the target VM. On the other side, the source VM
still remains stopped. As we see, the service encounters an outage since both VMs are forced
to shutdown. The bigger problem is inconsistent memory: all newly generated dirty pages in the
target VM (as the cases of❷ and❹) are lost. This disastrous scenario is similar to a sudden power
loss.
4.3.1.2 Pre-copy
In the scenario of pre-copy, the damage might be less than in post-copy migration. Similarly, once
the TCP connection is reset, the destination VM crashes; however, the source VM is still alive and
holds an entire up-to-date memory and processor states. In modern hypervisor implementation,
the whole migration procedure must be restarted. Since migration is typically used as a tool to
improve the performance of the VM or upgrade the server, such an attack would waste pre-copy’s
total migration time, consume system resources, and degrade the performance. In particular, the
service downtime of pre-copy is much larger than post-copy. If the TCP-RST attack happens during
the downtime, the downtime would be significantly increased because both VMs are shutdown.
4.3.2 Attacking VM Live Migration
4.3.2.1 Threat Model
The attacker sets it target on destroying VM live migration in the cloud environment by resetting the
TCP connection. We assume that the attacker knows several IP addresses of the servers in the
target cloud. By monitoring these IP addresses, the attacker attempts to block the migration from
the source server to the destination server. We also assume that at least one server is vulnerable
to the blind reset attack or side-channel reset attack mentioned in Section 4.2. The attacker can
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Figure 4.2: Number of RST packets per second in clouds.
send crafted packets with spoofed IP address to the target servers. Additionally, the server has
an open port (e.g., port 22) that allows the attacker to build a legitimate connection. In the cloud
environment, bandwidth between servers is limited. To ensure the quality of services of other
servers, administrators would not allow a migration to consume all network resources. Thus, we
assume that the migration process has a constant but limited speed.
4.3.2.2 TCP RST Packets in Clouds
The ability to send crafted RST packets is the pre-requisite for launching TCP reset attacks. We
investigate whether the firewalls of cloud vendors would drop the RST packets for safety purposes
or not. We choose two most popular clouds, Google Cloud Platform (GCP) and Amazon Web Ser-
vices (AWS). We build a small tool to flood crafted TCP RST packets into our subscribed instances,
and measure the number of receiving packets using tcpdump. We choose the time interval of one
second and repeat the experiment for 60 times. For AWS, we use a t2.micro instance in Amazon
EC2. For GCP, we run an instance with 1 vCPU and default other configurations. We test a limited
number of RST packets from inside and outside the clouds. From the outside, we send the crafted
packets from our own servers. Inside the cloud, we send the packets from another rented instance.
Figure 4.2 illustrates our results. Both cloud services accept crafted RST packets. In GCP, the
number of RST packets could be more than 100,000 per second from the inside and outside. For
EC2, the number of RST packets from the outside could be more than 60,000 per second. While
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the number of RST packets from the inside is smaller than from the outside in EC2, we can still
send about 23,000 packets per second. The cause of this difference might be that the outgoing
traffic of our t2.micro is limited.
The live migration of VM could be applied either inside one data center or across different data
center sites. For across site migration, once the cloud does not block RST packets, the migration
procedure is vulnerable to TCP reset attacks. For migration inside a cloud, attackers need to rent
instances inside the clouds. However, in these two clouds, the VMMs (Virtual Machine Managers)
block packets with spoofed inner IP addresses at the guest level. Under such a circumstance,
an attacker needs to either rent a dedicated server where it can fully control the hypervisor, or
compromise the VMM of the subscribed attacking instance. Such an exploitation is still feasible to
achieve [39,71], since the security vulnerabilities of VMMs have been reported on a regular basis
due to the complexity of VMMs.
4.3.2.3 Catch Timing and Four Tuples
Unlike a long-lived and idle TCP connection, VM live migration is a short procedure with heavy
traffic. Thus, the first step for an efficient attack is to catch the timing of live migration. Asmentioned
in Section 4.2, before the migration, the destination needs to enter into a ready-for-migration mode
by listening to a specific port. This port is opened for accepting a migration request. One critical
problem is that modern migration implementation completely ignores authentication, which means
that anyone who knows the destination IP address and port number can initiate the migration.
The attacker can launch fake migration requests (on the attacking machine) to all ports of the
target server. In order to catch the timing, the attacker can conduct the scan on a regular basis.
In most periods, the scanner should fail to establish any migration connections because the port
is closed. If the attacker succeeds in building the migration connection with the target server,
the source VM would be unable to initiate the migration, since all preparatory operations on the
target would have been occupied by the fake migration. Once the attacker disconnects with the
target server, the target VM simply crashes, which is similar to the reset attack on pre-copy VM
live migration. Otherwise, if the attacker discovers a newly opened port but is unable to build the
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migration connection, he has high confidence that this port is opened for VM live migration. In this
way, the attacker can obtain the timing as well as the target port number. Besides, similar approach
or previously described method [30] could be utilized to explore the rest of the tuples.
4.3.2.4 Resetting the Connection
After confirming the four tuples of an ongoing migration, the attacker can start to reset the TCP
connection by abusing the vulnerabilities in either the source server or the destination server. Pre-
vious research has shown multiple methods to obtain the correct sequence number by off-path
attackers [33, 50, 51, 93, 94]. Here we mainly discuss the exploitation of TCP blind attack and
the challenge ACK vulnerability. The identification of the vulnerability of the server is straightfor-
ward. Attackers can build a legitimate TCP connection with the target and attempt to terminate the
connection using in-window RST packets. If the in-window RST packet can cut the connection,
the attacker can launch a blind reset attack. Otherwise, if the target server only replies with 100
challenge ACKs per second, it means the server has a challenge ACK vulnerability.
Blind reset attack. If the server does not deploy the implementation of TCP following the rec-
ommended standard RFC 5961, resetting the TCP connection is easy. An in-window RST packet
can reset the connection. Hence, with the knowledge of four tuples of the connection, the attacker
simply floods the RST packets with sequence numbers increased by the window size. Once the at-
tacker can brute-force all the sequence number spaces, the connection is terminated. For example,
suppose the window size is around 10,000, and the attacker needs to flood 232/10000 ≈ 420, 000
RST packets. With 20,000 RST packets sent per second, a reset attack could be achieved in
merely 21 seconds.
Side-channel reset attacks on the source. In the case that the source server is vulnerable
to CVE-2016-5696, the attacker can conduct a reset attack on the source server following the
previous work [30], as in the case of I illustrated in Figure 4.3. While VM live migration generates
huge traffic from the source to the target, the backward traffic is relatively idle. The target merely
replies with regular ACKs (which would not consume the limit of challenge ACKs) corresponding
to the data packets. The sequence number of the backward traffic is invariable. We briefly list the
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Figure 4.3: Attack Scenarios.
attacking procedures here. The basic idea is to send multiple spoofed packets and 100 in-window
non-spoofed packets (in the legitimate connection) per second. If the number of replied ACKs is
less than 100, it means the spoofed packets trigger challenge ACKs. The detailed steps are: (1)
Synchronize with the clock on the server to ensure that all packets sent from the attacker arrive
within the same 1-second interval. (2) Identify the approximate sequence number range, which is
the range of window size multiplied by the number of packets sent. (3) Narrow down the sequence
number space to a single block (estimated window) through binary searching. Finally, (4) flood
RST packets in that block.
Side-channel reset attacks on the destination. Attacking the target server (as in the case
of II in Figure 4.3) is much more difficult than the source server case. The heavy traffic makes the
sequence number vary rapidly, leaving the previous method [30] no chance to shrink the sequence
number into a window after catching the approximate sequence number.
In order to the achieve the attack, we conduct two experiments to figure out the pattern of the
change of sequence number in VM live migration. We run different workloads on the source VM.
We then fix the throughput of migration to 8.54 Mbps, and start the migration with different migra-
tion approaches. Five workloads are chosen with the pre-copy option: (1) Idle without workloads;
(2) CacheBench benchmark; (3) Idle loop; (4) Stress benchmark; and (5) Stress with memory
configuration. One workload has the post-copy option: (6) Idle. We measure the change of se-
quence number in one second for a total of 50 instances. Figure 4.4(a) shows the boxplot result.
As we see, except for few outliers, the change of sequence number is almost the same in all
cases: around 10.6∗106 per second. In our second experiment, we set the speed limit of migration
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Figure 4.4: Factors Affecting the Change of Sequence No. of VM Live Migration.
to 17.08 Mbps, 33.82 Mbps, and 50.56 Mbps. The results in Figure 4.4(b) demonstrate that the
change of sequence number is linear to the speed limit. Overall, we have two major observations:
(1) the change of sequence number is quite constant and only related to the migration speed; (2)
The change of sequence number is irrelevant to the workloads running in the VM or migration
approaches.
After understanding these two features, the attacker can launch the reset attack on migration.
The basic idea is to obtain the rough speed of live migration and track the step that the sequence
number changes per second at the same time. Specifically, the attacker can reset the migration
with three procedures, as depicted in Algorithm 1. This algorithm is designed to reset a connection
with heavy traffic.
The first two steps are similar to the attack on the source server: get synchronized with the
target server, and identify the approximate sequence number range. After that, assuming the
attacker sends 4,000 packets per second with a block size 10,000, the range is 40,000,000. Then
the attacker can increase the sequence numbers of those probe packets with a relatively large
size (e.g., 5 times the range), and simply waits for the next hit, as described in Lines 5∼10. This
procedure, step profiling, could obtain an approximate value of the speed by dividing the increased
size by time consumption.
Lines 11∼24 present the next procedure, micro tuning. This step is the most critical one, and
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Algorithm 1 Identify and stalk the correct sequence number range
1: procedure Sequence_Number_Stalking(s′l, s′u)
2: stepo ← 5× (s′u - s′l);
3: su,l ← s′u,l + stepo;
4: range← (su - sl);
5: Step profiling:
6: while range_hit() do
7: count← count+ 1;
8: wait(1);
9: step← stepo/count;
10: su,l ← su,l + step;
11: Micro tuning:
12: while range_unmeet() do
13: if range_hit() then
14: binary_cut_range();
15: else if range_miss() then
16: left_shift_range();
17: if range_miss() for 3 times then
18: adjust_step();
19: if adjust_step() for 3 times then
20: su,l ← s′u,l + stepo;
21: step← stepo/(count + 1);
22: goto Micro tuning.
23: su,l ← su,l + step;
24: wait(1);
25: Connection reset:
26: for i in 20 do
27: flood(sl, su)
28: wait(1);
29: if failed then
30: goto Micro tunning.
has two goals: (1) this step is responsible for adjusting the speed as accurate as possible; (2) after
this step, the attacker should narrow down the range to an acceptable small value, so that he is able
to flood RST packets to cover all the sequence numbers in that range. To achieve those two goals,
the attacker can first assume that the estimated speed is smaller than the actual speed. Then,
every time the sequence number is hit in the range, the attacker cuts the range to the second half
part (Lines 13∼14), which could promise a future hit if the assumption is correct. If the sequence
number is not hit in the next second, the attacker slightly shifts the range to the left (Lines 15∼16).
If the sequence number still cannot hit within the range in a few times (e.g., 3), the attacker can
then slightly reduce the estimated speed (e.g., 1%), as shown in Lines 17∼18. If the hit does not
come even after several speed adjustments, it is highly probable that the assumption is incorrect.
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The attacker should recalculate the estimated speed, and repeat the micro tuning (Lines 19∼22).
The procedure is repeatedly conducted until the range is cut to a 2-4 block size.
The last procedure is connection reset, in which the attacker can flood RST packets with brute-
force all possible sequence numbers. The attacker may need several tries to reset the connection,
since the RST packet needs to hit the exactly correct sequence number. Another issue for this
step is that errors exist between the estimated speed and actual speed. After a few trials, the stalk
might be lost. Under such scenarios, the attacker needs to restart the next round of micro tuning
to resume the tracking of the correct sequence number.
4.4 Evaluations
In this section, we present the evaluation from three aspects: (1) the attacking consequences on
VM live migration in existing hypervisors; (2) the attacking effects on the running VM; and (3) the
effectiveness of our proposed reset algorithm.
4.4.1 Attacking Consequences
We first demonstrate that the TCP reset attack can cause the devastating consequences we ex-
pect. Our experiments are conducted on QEMU version 2.6. We also test QEMU 2.8 and 2.9,
which give similar results. We use two Ubuntu servers with Linux kernel 4.4 with independent,
public IP addresses.
We first start our modified malicious QEMU (scanner) to periodically monitor the targeted server
(destination) with one-minute-intervals. Then we initiate the setup preparation on both source and
destination servers and start the live migration with the post-copy approach. If our scanner suc-
cessfully establishes the migration connection with the target, the source server would be failed on
the migration connection. The VM on the target would be crashed if our scanner breaks the con-
nection. Otherwise, we launch the TCP-RST attack on the destination server using our proposed
algorithm. The migration runs into errors immediately once the attack succeeds. The destination
VM is crashed immediately, which is demonstrated in Figure 4.5(a). In some cases, the destination
VM would not be crashed, but totally unresponsive. Figure 4.5(b) shows the status of the source
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(a) Migration Results (Destination).
(b) Migration Status (Source).
Figure 4.5: Attack on Post-copy Live Migration.
VM. We can clearly see that the migration status is failed. Also, the source VM is on a paused
state waiting for the migration to finish. The result of pre-copy is quite similar. The difference is
that the source VM is still running after the attack, but the target VM is crashed.
4.4.2 Attacking Impact
We conduct the TCP reset attack in three different scenarios to demonstrate that resetting the VM
live migration could lead to (1) memory inconsistence on the victim VM; (2) significant increases
to the service downtime; and (3) performance downgrade on the application on the victim VM.
To ensure that the connection is reset at the same time for a fair comparison, we use tcpdump
to get the correct backward sequence number (from the destination to the source) and reset the
connection in all three cases.
4.4.2.1 Memory inconsistence
To expose the memory inconsistence problem, we build a simple application to simulate the online
transaction system. The application calculates the Fibonacci number using Fn = Fn−1+Fn−2. The
source VM only holds the initial value 0. We create a toy server that listens for incoming requests.
For every two seconds, the victim VM sends a request to the toy server asking for the next value
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Figure 4.6: Memory Inconsistence:
Incorrect Fibonacci Number.
Fn−1. Based on a counter (used as the index) maintained in the toy server, the toy server sends
the value to our victim VM.
The request from the victim VM guarantees that the application would have no action when the
victim is down in the downtime period. Also, the toy server replies with exactly 100 requests. The
victim VM keeps the generated sequence in memory until the toy server no longer replies to the
next corresponding value. We present the results on post-copy-based live migration, which suffers
from the memory inconsistence problem.
For the attack case, after the victim VM starts calculating the Fibonacci sequence, we launch the
TCP reset attack. At this time, the victim VM on the source server is paused. The VM immediately
runs in the destination server and keeps sending requests to our toy server. Once the reset attack
succeeds, the VM on the destination is crashed. We modify the hypervisor so that it initiates
another migration request immediately once observing the failure of the migration.
As demonstrated in Figure 4.6, the generated sequence when the VM is under a TCP reset
attack is represented by the grey dotted line. When the victim VM is paused on the VM, it only
obtained the value 5, which is the fifth Fibonacci number. Then the crashed VM in the first migration
keeps sending requests to the toy server, and obtains the 15th number. After this VM is crashed,
the re-migration soon opens a new VM running in the destination server. However, the memory of
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Figure 4.7: Downtime Increases.
this new VM stays at the fifth Fibonacci number and begins to calculate the sixth one. From the
perspective of the toy server, it treats the VM as calculating the 16th number because the requests
sent by the crashed VM consumes 10 counts. As a result, it sends the value 610 to the server.
The calculated value in the running VM is 615, which is wrong. Even worse, since the next number
is computed by this incorrect “Fibonacci” value, all of the following results are also incorrect due
to the memory inconsistence. As we see, compared with the black solid line representing the
correct Fibonacci number, the number of the generated sequence under attack is obviously less
than 100. Also, all calculated Fibonacci numbers after the fifth one are incorrect. While this is just
a simple application, the problem could be much more serious in realistic applications, such as
online trading.
4.4.2.2 Downtime Increases
In this experiment, we write a program to repeatedly obtain the difference between the current
time and the time that the program is started. The program runs on the victim VM and constantly
writes the time difference into a file. We use post-copy as the migration method. For pre-copy, if
the attack succeeds when the source VM is down, the result is similar. The re-migration happens
immediately once the failure of migration is detected. Figure 4.7 presents the results. Without an
attack, the program resumes working at 35s after themigration. Under a TCP-RST attack, although
the migration happens almost at the same time (about 5s), the program is resumed at 104s. The
downtime under attack is more than three times compared with a successful migration. Note that
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Figure 4.8: Performance Degradation.
the re-migration starts immediately in this experiment. Otherwise, the increase of downtime could
be much more serious.
4.4.2.3 Performance Impact
We use the time of compiling the Linux kernel to evaluate the performance. We run some back-
ground workloads in the source server to simulate the resource contention in the cloud environ-
ment. The workload on the source is heavy, and the VM is needed to migrate to another server. We
choose the pre-copy approach since the VM is still running, even while under attack. We measure
the time for compiling the Linux kernel 4.4 on three scenarios: (1) The VM successfully migrates to
the destination server, and (2) The migration is failed due to the TCP reset attack. As a result, the
victim VM is kept running in the source server; (3) the migration fails because of the attack, and a
re-migration follows immediately.
We present the time consumption for all three scenarios in Figure 4.8. If the migration is failed,
the time for compiling the kernel is about 1,169 seconds, since the VM is always running in the
source server suffering heavy resource contentions. If the migration succeeds, running it in the
destination could save massive amounts of time (about 500 seconds). The re-migration incurs a
worse performance compared to the successful migration since the VM is forced to run longer in
the source server.
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(a) 8.54 Mpbs. (b) 17.08 Mpbs. (c) 33.82 Mpbs. (d) 50.56 Mpbs.
Figure 4.9: Attacks on VM Live Migration with different throughput.
4.4.3 Effectiveness of the Reset Attack
As we mentioned before, if an attacker can send 20,000 RST packets per second, several seconds
would be enough to reset a TCP connection in a server whose TCP implementation does not follow
RFC 5961. We have also demonstrated that such a requirement is easily fulfilled in Section 3.
Here, we conduct experiments to investigate the effectiveness of launching TCP reset attack on
the destination server.
The first two procedures (synchronization and finding the approximate sequence number range)
are the same as previous work [30], which can be achieved in less than one minute. We do not
repeat similar experiments. Instead, we measure the time consumption for the proposed algo-
rithm (Algorithm 1). We start recording the time once the approximate sequence number range
is identified. We initiate the migration with the pre-copy option and conduct experiments under
four different throughput scenarios: 8.54 Mpbs, 17.08 Mbps, 33.82 Mbps, and 50.56 Mbps. For
each speed, we launch the reset attack 10 consecutive times, and each attack does not stop until
it successfully resets the connections. To infer the approximate sequence number range, we send
4,000 crafted RST packets per second.
We illustrate the results of our experiments in Figure 4.9. We break down the time consumption
for each phase: step profiling (phase 1), micro tuning (phase 2), and connection reset (phase 3).
As we mentioned in Section 4.3, one round of phase 3 might be failed to reset the connection
due to the heavy traffic. We list the number of rounds in phase 3 above each bar. The total
time is less than 80 seconds when the throughput is 8.54 mpbs. Also, the difficulty to reset the
connection is raised as the throughput increases: the average time to reset a migration with a
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50.56 mpbs throughput exceeds two minutes. Since the total migration time lasts tens of minutes
(migrating the disk involves more time), attackers would be able to reset the migration connection.
In particular, phase 1 takes about 10 seconds to roughly profile the step size of the variation of
sequence numbers. Phase 2 consumes much more time to refine the speed and narrow down the
range of sequence numbers. In some cases (as the seventh bar in Figure 4.9(a)), the attacker
needs to recalculate the estimated speed in phase 1, and restarts phase 2, which almost doubles
the time. In the last phase, resetting the connection by flooding RST packets requires a little
luck. While sometimes it merely takes seconds to succeed, it takes at most five rounds to reset
the migration when the throughput is 50.56 mpbs. Though our experiments are limited by the
bandwidth of our servers, the results demonstrate that enhancing the speed of migration could
make the migration safer to some extent.
4.5 Defense
An intuitive approach to avoiding the unrecoverable negatives caused by unexpected interruptions
is to re-establish the TCP connection. The migration could be resumed immediately instead of
rebooting the instance or re-setting the whole migration step. This approach, which can effectively
prevent the memory inconsistency problem, involves non-trivial engineering efforts. First, after
receiving the RST packet from an attacker, the server hosting the source VM simply closes the
TCP connection. To resume the migration process, a new TCP connection must be established.
This is totally different from resuming a hang connection due to poor networking conditions. Even
worse, the target server is unable to determine if the connection is closed or suffers from packet
losses caused by a bad networking condition. From the perspective of the target server, it cannot
know the termination of the connection, and hangs in a blocking state until the TCP keepalives
timeout is reached. Those cases make it difficult to design a valid auto re-connection mechanism.
Second, the migration process must be careful to record the copying step of memory pages on
both source and target sides. From the perspective of the source server, the number of accepted
packets on-the-fly is unknown. A naive re-transmitting strategy might lead to overlaps or losses
of memory, which would crash the target VM. Finally, re-establishing the TCP connection does
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not fundamentally solve the problem. Malicious attackers can keep attacking the migration and
terminate the re-connected TCP connection. The results could significantly increase VM downtime
or degrade performance on both sides.
Another strategy is ignoring the TCP RST packets when the migration is in progress. By dis-
carding the RST packet, attackers are unable to cut the TCP connection by crafting reset packets.
To reduce the abjective effects, the prohibition of TCP RST packets should be restricted within the
specific migration connection. This could be achieved by recording the four tuples <bQm`+2 AS
//`2bb- bQm`+2 TQ`i MmK#2`- /2biBMiBQM AS //`2bb- /2biBMiBQM TQ`i //`2bb>. Once
the data transfer starts, the hypervisor can block the RST packets by setting a firewall rule (e.g.,
setting an BTi#H2b rule), which does not require any change to the kernel code. One issue is
that BTi#H2b suffers a significant performance penalty. Particularly, if multiple migrations are
conducted simultaneously, each networking packet, including those non-RST packets, must be
checked by all BTi#H2b rules, one by one.
Another option is to reply to a challenge ACK when the RST packet hits the exactly correct
sequence number. Otherwise, the TCP works as usual. Such a method can maintain the integrity
of the original TCP. Also, it only affects the performance of processing RST packets. However,
such a method involves the modification of the kernel.
We implement the defense mechanism by preventing the reset of the TCP connection for the
migration stream. We modify the Linux kernel with version 4.4 and QEMU 2.6. We create a
pseudo file in procfs to record the four tuples of the migration connection. The pseudo file is
mounted with root permission so that only the system administrator can view and modify it. The
four tuples are recorded when the migration connection is established, and is maintained in a map
form. During the migration, instead of resetting the connection, the incoming RST packet with
the correct sequence number would trigger a challenge ACK. All other functionalities of TCP are
left unchanged. Obviously, the effects of the defense are just like the case without a TCP reset
attack. In our evaluation experiments, our implementation works as expected to provide effective
protection.
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4.6 Related Work
4.6.1 VM Live Migration
VM live migration with pre-copy was first proposed in 2005 [34]. Then, several new approaches
based on pre-copy were proposed to improve performance, including the Fast Transparent Mi-
gration [88], Delta Compression Techniques [109], Sandpiper [115], and MiG [97]. Hines [58, 59]
presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of post-copy VM live migration in 2009.
Ali [81] designed XvMotion, allowing VM migration over long distances. Instead of improving the
performance, our work aims to avoid performance downgrades by fixing potential vulnerabilities.
Perez et al. [92] presented a brief introduction on the potential threats suffered by VM live
migration. The prerequisite for attacking VM live migration is the ability to detect the migration
process. König et al. [70] showed that the RTT (round trip time) of ICMP packets could be utilized
by outside attackers to detect the migration process. Fiebig [44] further demonstrated that the mi-
gration process could be detected by a combination of delay measurements by ICMP pings and
time-lag detection with the NTP (network time protocol). In particular, they presented several inter-
nal approaches for detecting the process since VM live migration affects a server’s performance.
While we present a novel approach for exploiting flaws in existing hypervisors’ implementations,
the above methods are complementary for us to confirm the detection result.
Another serious issue is the lack of encryption in VM live migration. Several works have been
proposed on both sides of the issue [90,108,128]. Oberheide et al. [89] developed a tool to perform
man-in-the-middle attacks on the VM livemigration bymanipulating thememory on the network. As
a result, encryption has been introduced in VM livemigration, and KVMhas supported livemigration
on TLS. However, despite those protections, TCP-RST attacks occur in the transportation layer,
and thus can still cause the unrecoverable effects on VM live migration.
4.6.2 TCP Attacks
The security of TCP, especially in off-path attacks, always receives much attention. Gilad et al. [50]
performed several off-path attacks on based on a global IP-ID counter that allows an attacker to
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learn the sequence numbers of the client and server in a TCP connection. Several works [33,93,94]
abuse OS packet counters to determine whether the guessed sequence number is correct. Gilad
et al. [51] also proposed techniques to infer the TCP connection and four-tuples between two hosts.
While those techniques could be utilized to attack VM live migration, we leverage the blind reset
attack and TCP challenge ACK vulnerability in this chapter. In addition to cracking the sequence
number, there are also several other security issues for TCP. Alexander et al. [24] presented a novel
technique for estimating the RTT latency between two off-path hosts. Ensafi et al. [41] showed
that it is even possible for an attacker to port scan a network from outside the firewall. Abramov
et al. [22] presented ACK-Storm DoS attacks that could reach a level of 400,000 amplifications
against popular websites. Different from those works focusing on vulnerabilities in TCP protocol,
we study the devastating consequences on VM caused by TCP reset attacks.
4.6.3 Denial-of-Service Attacks on Clouds
DoS attacks on clouds are also closely related to our work. For instance, power attacks [123] can
cause power outages in data centers, and lead to forced shutdowns for servers on the same rack or
on the same power distribution unit. For those DoS attacks [49], attackers usually exploit specific
techniques to co-locate multiple controlled instances on the same physical server to amplify the
attack’s effects. Techniques like cache [121], memory bus [118], networking [98], and system pro-
cess statistics [112] have been proved to achieve co-residence in clouds. Furthermore, attackers
can achieve a malicious instance co-resident with the target VM and launch side-channel attacks.
Zhang et al. [130, 131] showed several approaches for extracting private keys and collecting po-
tentially sensitive application data on co-resident instances. While our proposed attack does not
require co-resident instance with the target VM, we believe co-residence techniques could be help-
ful since it can provide insider information. We plan to explore in this direction in the future. Also,
our work demonstrates that resetting the TCP connection of post-copy migration could generate
similar effects of a power outage.
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4.7 Chapter Summary
Virtual machine live migration has become popular because of its diverse use-cases for cloud ven-
dors and power-users alike. It offers a scalable mechanism to maintain low-level systems, manage
faults and balance workloads among different physical servers. In this chapter, we demonstrate
that by disrupting the robustness of the underlying network substrate using a successful TCP reset
attack, an adversary can cause unrecoverable memory inconsistency problems. This is espe-
cially true for post-copy-based VM live migration approaches. In addition, the termination of the
TCP connection could also cause significant service downtime and affect the running VM’s perfor-
mance. We further detail a procedure for resetting the migration connection utilizing heavy traffic.
This procedure includes a novel technique to measure and expose the timing of the migration pro-
cess, and a new method to off-path attack the TCP connection. Our evaluation demonstrates that
the attack is effective and able to cause the expected devastating consequences. Finally, we con-
duct a large-scale measurement to investigate the potential TCP reset threats in two commercial
clouds. Our results show that attackers can send a large amount of TCP RST packets per second,
and many instances are still vulnerable to the TCP reset threats.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
This dissertation presents a study on the potential security vulnerabilities in today’s clouds and data
centers from low-level infrastructures like cooling systems and power supply facilities to high-level
isolation techniques including virtual machines and Linux containers. In particular, we first reveal a
new security vulnerability in a cloud’s cooling infrastructure, named as reduced cooling redundancy
that could be abused to cause cooling failures in a data center. Then, we present a systematic
study on the information leakage problem and its security implications in public commercial multi-
tenancy container clouds. Finally, we investigate security threats that exist in the process of VM
live migration and present detailed techniques to cause memory inconsistency for the post-copy
based approach. The three major contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows.
• While data centers have widely adopted aggressive energy saving policies such as raising
supply air temperature of cooling systems and power over-subscription, we reveal that those
policies lead to reduced cooling redundancies that can be exploited to lower servers’ reli-
ability, raise cooling cost, and even cause massive power outages. We conduct extensive
physical measurement studies to understand the thermal characteristics of a single server,
and propose various attack vectors on both virtualized and non-virtualized environments.
We further perform data center level simulations based on CFD analysis for the feasibility of
launching thermal attacks on the rack and data center levels. While this thermal vulnerability
cannot be completely fixed without increasing cooling redundancies, we propose a high-level
dynamic thermal-aware load balancing to mitigate the threat.
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• Relying on multiple building blocks (e.g., namespace) in the Linux kernel, containers can
achieve near native performance with resource isolation. However, the incomplete or buggy
implementation might lead to the expose of system-wide sensitive information among con-
tainers. We present the first systematic study on the information leakage problem in a
container: we uncover the existence of more than thirty leakage channels in five commer-
cial multi-tenancy container clouds. We demonstrate that those in-container interfaces al-
low attackers to retrieve the information of host OSes and co-located containers, verify co-
residence, and launch advanced cloud-based attacks such as synergistic power attack. Fi-
nally, we discuss the root cause of the information leakage in depth, and propose a two-stage
defense mechanism, which includes a power-based namespace implemented in the Linux
kernel. The experimental results show that our solution is effective and incurs trivial perfor-
mance overhead.
• Acting as a regular tool for system and resource management in cloud services, VM live
migration must be fully secured to ensure minimal disruptions. We expose that the funda-
mental of VM live migration might be insecure: the entire procedure relies upon reliable TCP
connectivity to transfer all VM states, which is actually vulnerable to malicious attacks. We
demonstrate that attackers can cause devastating consequences to VMs in the live migration
by intentionally aborting the underlying TCP connection. Those include unrecoverable mem-
ory inconsistency for a post-copy-based VM live migration, a significant increase in downtime
and performance degradation of the running VM. In particular, we present the algorithms in
detail to mount TCP-reset attacks on VM live migration by exploiting multiple vulnerabilities.
The experimental results on QEMU+KVM environments show that the state-of-art live mi-
gration techniques (e.g., post-copy) suffer such a vulnerability. To address this problem, we
propose and implement effective defense mechanisms to secure the process by modifying
the Linux kernel.
In our future work, we will keep focusing on defense against the emerging threats in the cloud
and data center environments. We will conduct a deep study on advanced exploitation of the infor-
mation leakage channels in containers, whose damage might be more than that incurred by DDoS
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attacks: they could be exploited as side channels to infer private information of running applica-
tions of other tenants. Meanwhile, attackers can utilize them as covert channels to deliver illegal
commands. From the defense perspective, we will systematically explore the information leakage
through a whole-kernel program analysis. This analysis will include but not limit to memory-based
pseudo file systems, system calls, input/output control, and network I/O. Moreover, we will attempt
to propose proactive thermal control systems based on real-time server temperature prediction to
defend against thermal attacks. Through the combination of (1) offline physical server placement
adjustment, (2) online prediction-based defense, and (3) the exploitation of energy storage de-
vices, our proposed proactive systems can make data centers more resilient to emerging threats
like power and thermal attacks.
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